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- zesh-ai-layer
- [SCA] Zesh AI Layer | Zesh-Coin | Dec2024
Introduction
We express our gratitude to the Zesh AI Layer team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.
Zesh AI Layer (ZAI) currency is a SUI coin that facilitates seamless initialization and minting of tokens to the deployer address.
Document | |
|---|---|
| Name | Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Zesh AI Layer |
| Audited By | Jakub Heba |
| Approved By | Przemyslaw Swiatowiec |
| Website | https://zesh.ai→ |
| Changelog | 16/12/2024 - Preliminary Report, 17/12/2024 - Secondary Report |
| Platform | Sui |
| Language | MOVE |
| Tags | Sui, Coin |
| Methodology | https://hackenio.cc/sc_methodology→ |
Document
- Name
- Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Zesh AI Layer
- Audited By
- Jakub Heba
- Approved By
- Przemyslaw Swiatowiec
- Website
- https://zesh.ai→
- Changelog
- 16/12/2024 - Preliminary Report, 17/12/2024 - Secondary Report
- Platform
- Sui
- Language
- MOVE
- Tags
- Sui, Coin
- Methodology
- https://hackenio.cc/sc_methodology→
Review Scope | |
|---|---|
| Repository | https://github.com/ZeshDev/zesh-coin→ |
| Commit | 6f34f9f34e4f5e579ca4d3bb1ee62020218feef8 |
Review Scope
- Repository
- https://github.com/ZeshDev/zesh-coin→
- Commit
- 6f34f9f34e4f5e579ca4d3bb1ee62020218feef8
Audit Summary
The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report
Documentation quality
Functional requirements are listed in README.md file.
Technical description is partially provided.
Code quality
The code duplicates commonly known Coin initialization standard.
Test coverage
Code coverage of the project is 0% (branch coverage), with a mutation score of 0%.
All tests are commented-out.
System Overview
ZAI — simple Sui coin that mints all initial supply to a deployer. Additional minting is not allowed.
It has the following attributes:
Name: Zesh AI Layer
Symbol: ZAUI
Decimals: 6
Total supply: 500m tokens.
Privileged roles
The deployer of ZAI is minting 500m supply of tokens to himself during initialization.
No other privileges are assigned to that address.
Potential Risks
Total token supply is minted to the deployer account without allocation logic, which could lead to concerns over transparency and control in token distribution.
Findings
Code ― | Title | Status | Severity | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| F-2024-7705 | Wrong value hardcoded in TOTAL_SUPPLY leads to too few minted tokens | fixed | Medium |
Appendix 1. Definitions
Severities
When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.
Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:
Severity | Description |
|---|---|
Critical | Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
High | High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
Medium | Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category. |
Low | Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution. |
Severity
- Critical
Description
- Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- High
Description
- High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- Medium
Description
- Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.
Severity
- Low
Description
- Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
Potential Risks
The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.
Appendix 2. Scope
The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:
Scope Details | |
|---|---|
| Repository | https://github.com/ZeshDev/zesh-coin→ |
| Commit | 6f34f9f34e4f5e579ca4d3bb1ee62020218feef8 |
| Whitepaper | - |
| Requirements | https://github.com/ZeshDev/zesh-coin/README.md→ |
| Technical Requirements | https://github.com/ZeshDev/zesh-coin/README.md→ |
Scope Details
- Repository
- https://github.com/ZeshDev/zesh-coin→
- Commit
- 6f34f9f34e4f5e579ca4d3bb1ee62020218feef8
- Whitepaper
- -
- Requirements
- https://github.com/ZeshDev/zesh-coin/README.md→
- Technical Requirements
- https://github.com/ZeshDev/zesh-coin/README.md→
Assets in Scope
Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Additional Recommendations
The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.
To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:
Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.
Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.
Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.
These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.