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Audit name:

[SCA] Shuttle Labs | Solidity | Jan2025

Date:

Jan 30, 2025

Table of Content

Introduction
Audit Summary
System Overview
Potential Risks
Findings
Appendix 1. Definitions
Appendix 2. Scope
Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Disclaimer

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Introduction

We express our gratitude to the Shuttle Labs team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.

Shuttle Labs is multi-chain decentralized exchange that utilizes Lit Protocol to enable \<10 second cross chain swaps.

Document

NameSmart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Shuttle Labs
Audited BySeher Saylik
Approved ByGrzegorz Trawiński
Websitebridgesmarter.com
Changelog22/01/2025 - Preliminary Report
30/01/2025 - Final Report
PlatformBase, Optimism, Arbitrum, Polygon, BSC, Avalanche, Ethereum
LanguageSolidity
TagsBridge, Vault
Methodologyhttps://hackenio.cc/sc_methodology
  • Document

    Name
    Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Shuttle Labs
    Audited By
    Seher Saylik
    Approved By
    Grzegorz Trawiński
    Changelog
    22/01/2025 - Preliminary Report
    30/01/2025 - Final Report
    Platform
    Base, Optimism, Arbitrum, Polygon, BSC, Avalanche, Ethereum
    Language
    Solidity
    Tags
    Bridge, Vault

Review Scope

Repositoryhttps://github.com/Shuttle-Labs/genius-contracts
Commitf57f67b

Audit Summary

11Total Findings
9Resolved
2Accepted
0Mitigated

The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report

Documentation quality

  • Functional requirements are partially provided.

  • Technical description is not provided.

Code quality

  • The code contains some gas-inefficient usages.

  • The development environment is configured.

Test coverage

Code coverage could not measured due to an error occurred when running “forge coverage” command.

System Overview

Shuttle Labs is a bridge solution with the following contracts:

GeniusGasTank — a contract that facilitates gasless sponsored transactions by leveraging Permit2 functionality for token approvals, batching transactions, and executing them via a proxy.

GeniusVaultCore — a contract that provides cross-chain liquidity management and swaps by utilizing stablecoins as the primary asset, ensuring efficient asset handling and order processing. It incorporates staking, order creation, and liquidity rebalancing mechanisms.

GeniusRouter — a contract that enables transaction aggregation by handling token approvals, transfers, and calls to external contracts through Permit2 and a proxy. It facilitates operations like swaps, order creation, and cross-chain transactions by interacting with GeniusVault and other contracts.

GeniusActions  — a contract that manages actions within the Genius Protocol by enabling their addition, removal, and modification.

GeniusVault  —  a contract that acts as a cross-chain stablecoin bridge with integrated price-based deposit protection, ensuring secure handling of stablecoin transactions. It leverages Chainlink price feeds to safeguard against stablecoin depegging and includes features for fee collection, order creation, and liquidity management.

GeniusProxyCall  — a contract that allows for aggregating and executing multiple operations, including token approvals, transfers, and calls to other contracts, in a single transaction.

MultiSendCallOnly  — contract is a utility that allows batching multiple transactions into a single execution, where each transaction is a call operation (direct external function call with optional value transfer).

GeniusErrors  — a library that defines a comprehensive set of custom error types for use within the Genius protocol.

Privileged roles

  • The admin of the GeniusActions contract can;

    • set the orchestrators

    • set the commit hash

    • add a new action

    • update an action's status

    • update an action's IPFS hash

  • The Sentinel role of the GeniusActions contract can;

    • disable an action

    • disable an orchestrator

  • The admin of the GeniusGasTank contract can;

    • set the fee recipient

    • set the proxy call contract

    • unpause the contract

  • The admin or orchestrator role of GeniusVault contract can;

    • claim fees

  • The admin  role of GeniusVaultCore contract can;

    • set rebalance threshold

    • set the proxy call contract

    • unpause the contract

    • set the price feed address

    • set target chain minimum fee amount

    • set stable coin price boundaries

    • set max order amount

  • The orchestrator role of GeniusVaultCore contract can;

    • set rebalance threshold

    • cancel an order

Potential Risks

All bridge operations are executed by orchestrators, which operate off-chain. This reliance introduces potential risks, as malicious actors may target orchestrators to disrupt operations, manipulate transactions, or exploit vulnerabilities in their off-chain processes. Additionally, the centralized nature of orchestrator-driven execution could expose the system to risks of collusion, downtime, or compromise, which may impact the security and reliability of the bridge operations.

The swap data or call data to handle stable coins passed during proxy calls is provided by orchestrators off-chain and cannot be verified. This introduces a significant risk as the validity and accuracy of the data cannot be inherently verified on-chain.

The bridging operations rely on staked tokens, creating a risk where user funds may be temporarily inaccessible or unavailable for withdrawal if they are actively being utilized in a bridging process.

The use of unlimited token approvals (e.g., type(uint256).max) in approveTokenExecute and similar functions leaves the protocol exposed to potential vulnerabilities if the approved contracts or addresses are compromised.

Findings

Code
Title
Status
Severity
F-2025-8438Missing Minimum Order Amount Validation in Genius Protocol Contracts
accepted

Medium
F-2025-8418Lack of Order Cancellation and Validation
fixed

Medium
F-2025-8292Stale or Incorrect Price Data from Chainlink's latestRoundData
fixed

Medium
F-2025-8289Improper Token Amount Conversion Leading to Free Minting and Token Burn
fixed

Medium
F-2025-8412Accounting Issues Related to Possible Fee-on-Transfer Tokens in Genius Contracts
accepted

Low
F-2025-8360Missing Chain ID in Message Signature Can Cause Replay Attacks
fixed

Low
F-2025-8433Use != 0 Instead of > 0 for Gas Optimization
fixed

Observation
F-2025-8432Use of Magic Numbers in Percentage Validation
fixed

Observation
F-2025-8430Floating Pragma
fixed

Observation
F-2025-8429Inconsistent Use of revert and require Statements
fixed

Observation
1-10 of 11 findings

Identify vulnerabilities in your smart contracts.

Appendix 1. Definitions

Severities

When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.

Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:

Severity

Description

Critical
Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

High
High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

Medium
Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

Low
Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
  • Severity

    Critical

    Description

    Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    High

    Description

    High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    Medium

    Description

    Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

    Severity

    Low

    Description

    Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.

Potential Risks

The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.

Appendix 2. Scope

Appendix Scope

The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:

Scope Details

Repositoryhttps://github.com/Shuttle-Labs/genius-contracts
Commitf57f67be65e8797506fd8d78ddfe7cd933639c6e
Retest commit5212a9c9dbfa3b8aa552d3e4df0850dfb1f8e5d9
WhitepaperN/A
Requirementshttps://shuttlelabs.notion.site/Genius-Docs-159eae0682dd47a39446ac9bb7b7afda
Technical RequirementsN/A

Assets in Scope

GeniusActions.sol - GeniusActions.sol
GeniusGasTank.sol - GeniusGasTank.sol
GeniusMultiTokenVault.sol - GeniusMultiTokenVault.sol
GeniusProxyCall.sol - GeniusProxyCall.sol
GeniusRouter.sol - GeniusRouter.sol
GeniusVault.sol - GeniusVault.sol
GeniusVaultCore.sol - GeniusVaultCore.sol
interfaces
IGeniusActions.sol - interfaces › IGeniusActions.sol
IGeniusGasTank.sol - interfaces › IGeniusGasTank.sol
IGeniusMultiTokenVault.sol - interfaces › IGeniusMultiTokenVault.sol
IGeniusProxyCall.sol - interfaces › IGeniusProxyCall.sol
IGeniusRouter.sol - interfaces › IGeniusRouter.sol
IGeniusVault.sol - interfaces › IGeniusVault.sol
libs
GeniusErrors.sol - libs › GeniusErrors.sol
MultiSendCallOnly.sol - libs › MultiSendCallOnly.sol

Appendix 3. Additional Valuables

Verification of System Invariants

During the audit of Shuttle Labs, Hacken followed its methodology by performing fuzz-testing on the project's main functions. Foundry , a tool used for fuzz-testing, was employed to check how the protocol behaves under various inputs. Due to the complex and dynamic interactions within the protocol, unexpected edge cases might arise. Therefore, it was important to use fuzz-testing to ensure that several system invariants hold true in all situations.

Fuzz-testing allows the input of many random data points into the system, helping to identify issues that regular testing might miss. A specific Echidna fuzzing suite was prepared for this task, and throughout the assessment, 9 invariants were tested over 10,000 runs. This thorough testing ensured that the system works correctly even with unexpected or unusual inputs.

Invariant

Test Result

Run Count

GeniusVaultCore::stakeDeposit(), GeniusVaultCore::stakeWithdraw() Depositing and withdrawing any amount of stablecoin should not lose fundsFailed10k
GeniusVaultCore::stakeDeposit(), GeniusVaultCore::stakeWithdraw() Should deposit and withdraw any amount successfullyPassed10k
GeniusVault::createOrder() Should revert when an invalid amount of fee is providedPassed10k
GeniusVault::createOrder() Order hashes must be unique when different seeds providedPassed10k
GeniusRouter::swapAndCreateOrder() When creating an order with any amount , it should receive the correct stable coin amountPassed10k
GeniusRouter::swapAndCreateOrder() When creating an order with any amount , the vault should receive the feePassed10k
GeniusRouter::swapAndCreateOrderPermit2() It should revert when an invalid token address is provided by the orchestratorPassed10k
GeniusRouter::swapAndCreateOrderPermit2() It should revert when an invalid nonce is provided by the orchestratorPassed10k
GeniusRouter::createOrderPermit2() It should revert when invalid amount is provided by the orchestratorPassed10k
  • Invariant

    GeniusVaultCore::stakeDeposit(), GeniusVaultCore::stakeWithdraw() Depositing and withdrawing any amount of stablecoin should not lose funds

    Test Result

    Failed

    Run Count

    10k

    Invariant

    GeniusVaultCore::stakeDeposit(), GeniusVaultCore::stakeWithdraw() Should deposit and withdraw any amount successfully

    Test Result

    Passed

    Run Count

    10k

    Invariant

    GeniusVault::createOrder() Should revert when an invalid amount of fee is provided

    Test Result

    Passed

    Run Count

    10k

    Invariant

    GeniusVault::createOrder() Order hashes must be unique when different seeds provided

    Test Result

    Passed

    Run Count

    10k

    Invariant

    GeniusRouter::swapAndCreateOrder() When creating an order with any amount , it should receive the correct stable coin amount

    Test Result

    Passed

    Run Count

    10k

    Invariant

    GeniusRouter::swapAndCreateOrder() When creating an order with any amount , the vault should receive the fee

    Test Result

    Passed

    Run Count

    10k

    Invariant

    GeniusRouter::swapAndCreateOrderPermit2() It should revert when an invalid token address is provided by the orchestrator

    Test Result

    Passed

    Run Count

    10k

    Invariant

    GeniusRouter::swapAndCreateOrderPermit2() It should revert when an invalid nonce is provided by the orchestrator

    Test Result

    Passed

    Run Count

    10k

    Invariant

    GeniusRouter::createOrderPermit2() It should revert when invalid amount is provided by the orchestrator

    Test Result

    Passed

    Run Count

    10k

Additional Recommendations

The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.

To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:

  • Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.

  • Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.

  • Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.

These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.

Disclaimer