Introduction
We express our gratitude to the Reactor Trade team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.
PledgeSignature is a signature-based payment authorization system that allows users to execute pledges using either native tokens (ETH) or whitelisted ERC20 tokens. The contract acts as a trustless escrow that validates cryptographically signed authorization from off-chain signers before accepting user payments.
Document | |
|---|---|
| Name | Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Reactor Trade |
| Audited By | Kornel Światłowski, Ataberk Yavuzer |
| Approved By | Ivan Bondar |
| Website | https://www.reactor.trade/→ |
| Changelog | 05/11/2025 - Preliminary Report |
| 25/11/2025 - Final Report | |
| Platform | Ethereum |
| Language | Solidity |
| Tags | Payment Gateway, Signatures |
| Methodology | https://docs.hacken.io/methodologies/smart-contracts→ |
Document
- Name
- Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Reactor Trade
- Audited By
- Kornel Światłowski, Ataberk Yavuzer
- Approved By
- Ivan Bondar
- Website
- https://www.reactor.trade/→
- Changelog
- 05/11/2025 - Preliminary Report
- 25/11/2025 - Final Report
- Platform
- Ethereum
- Language
- Solidity
- Tags
- Payment Gateway, Signatures
Review Scope | |
|---|---|
| Verified Contract URL | https://etherscan.io/address/0xe0ed409c0071a9350044554d130737314b6de680#code→ |
| Remediation Contract URL | https://etherscan.io/address/0xc9104dc2afea2b971c7aeaaf0667dc32a67c607e#code→ |
Review Scope
- Verified Contract URL
- https://etherscan.io/address/0xe0ed409c0071a9350044554d130737314b6de680#code→
- Remediation Contract URL
- https://etherscan.io/address/0xc9104dc2afea2b971c7aeaaf0667dc32a67c607e#code→
Audit Summary
The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report
{Finding_Table?columns=title,severity,status&setting.filter.type=Vulnerability}
Documentation quality
Functional requirements are not provided.
Technical description is not provided.
Code quality
The development environment is not configured.
Best practice violations.
Insufficient Gas modeling.
Test coverage
Code coverage of the project is 0%.
No test suite is provided.
System Overview
PledgeSignature is a signature-based payment authorization system that allows users to execute pledges using either native tokens (ETH) or whitelisted ERC20 tokens. The contract acts as a trustless escrow that validates cryptographically signed authorization from off-chain signers before accepting user payments.
The system integrates with a Rust backend through event emissions, enabling a hybrid on-chain/off-chain architecture where payment authorizations are generated off-chain but executed and enforced on-chain.
PledgeSignature.sol:
The main contract implementing the pledge authorization system with the following key features:
Core Functionality:
Signature-based pledges: Users execute pledges by providing a signature from an authorized signer along with payment details
Multi-token support: Accepts both native tokens (ETH via
address(0)) and whitelisted ERC20 tokensEIP-712 compliance: Uses typed structured data hashing for secure signature verification
Replay protection: Implements per-user nonce system to prevent replay attacks
Token whitelist: Only pre-approved tokens can be used for pledges
Key Parameters:
EIP-712 Domain:
Name:
"PledgeSignature"Version:
"1"
Nonce System: Per-user sequential nonces for replay protection
Default Whitelisted Token Native token (
address(0)) is whitelisted by default
Main Functions:
pledgeWithSignature(): Primary function for executing pledges with signature authorizationgetSignatureHash(): Helper function for off-chain signature generationsetTokenWhitelist()/setTokenWhitelistBatch(): Manage approved payment tokenswithdraw(): Admin function to extract accumulated fundspause()/unpause(): Emergency circuit breaker functionality
Privileged Roles
The contract implements role-based access control using OpenZeppelin's AccessControl:
DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE
The admin role has the most extensive privileges and complete control over the system:
Grant and revoke all roles including
SIGNER_ROLEandTOKEN_MANAGER_ROLEWithdraw all accumulated funds (both native and ERC20 tokens) without restrictions
Pause and unpause the entire contract, halting all pledge operations
Appointed to contract deployer (
msg.sender) at deployment
SIGNER_ROLE
Authorized signers can generate valid signatures for pledge transactions:
Sign authorization messages that allow users to execute pledges
Determine pledge parameters (amounts, tokens, deadlines)
Control which transactions are authorized off-chain
TOKEN_MANAGER_ROLE
Token managers control which tokens are accepted for pledges:
Add tokens to the whitelist via
setTokenWhitelist()Remove tokens from the whitelist
Batch whitelist operations via
setTokenWhitelistBatch()
Potential Risks
Administrative Key Control Risks: The digital contract architecture relies on administrative keys for critical operations. Centralized control over these keys presents a significant security risk, as compromise or misuse can lead to unauthorized actions or loss of funds.
Findings
Code ― | Title | Status | Severity | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| F-2025-1383 | Unsafe Transfer Method for Native Token Withdrawal | fixed | Low | |
| F-2025-1382 | Missing Amount Parameter Validation | fixed | Low | |
| F-2025-1382 | EIP-712 String Encoding Violation | fixed | Low | |
| F-2025-1384 | No Event Emission on Withdrawal | fixed | Observation | |
| F-2025-1384 | No Balance Check Before Withdrawal | accepted | Observation | |
| F-2025-1383 | Gas Optimization Opportunities in Loop | fixed | Observation | |
| F-2025-1383 | No Duplicate Check in Batch Whitelist Function | fixed | Observation | |
| F-2025-1383 | No UUID Length Validation | fixed | Observation | |
| F-2025-1383 | Missing Event Emission in Constructor | accepted | Observation | |
| F-2025-1383 | Extensive Admin Powers Lead to Centralization Risks | accepted | Observation |
Appendix 1. Definitions
Severities
When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.
Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:
Severity | Description |
|---|---|
Critical | Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
High | High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
Medium | Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category. |
Low | Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution. |
Severity
- Critical
Description
- Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- High
Description
- High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- Medium
Description
- Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.
Severity
- Low
Description
- Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
Potential Risks
The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.
Appendix 2. Scope
The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:
Scope Details | |
|---|---|
| Verified Contract URL | https://etherscan.io/address/0xe0ed409c0071a9350044554d130737314b6de680#code→ |
| Remediation Contract URL | https://etherscan.io/address/0xc9104dc2afea2b971c7aeaaf0667dc32a67c607e#code→ |
| Whitepaper | N/A |
| Technical Requirements | N/A |
Scope Details
- Verified Contract URL
- https://etherscan.io/address/0xe0ed409c0071a9350044554d130737314b6de680#code→
- Remediation Contract URL
- https://etherscan.io/address/0xc9104dc2afea2b971c7aeaaf0667dc32a67c607e#code→
- Whitepaper
- N/A
- Technical Requirements
- N/A
Assets in Scope
Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Additional Recommendations
The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.
To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:
Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.
Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.
Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.
These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.
Frameworks and Methodologies
This security assessment was conducted in alignment with recognised penetration testing standards, methodologies and guidelines, including the NIST SP 800-115 – Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment →, and the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) →, These assets provide a structured foundation for planning, executing, and documenting technical evaluations such as vulnerability assessments, exploitation activities, and security code reviews. Hacken’s internal penetration testing methodology extends these principles to Web2 and Web3 environments to ensure consistency, repeatability, and verifiable outcomes.