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Audit name:

[SCA] Reactor | Reactor-Contracts | Nov2025

Date:

Nov 25, 2025

Table of Content

Introduction
Audit Summary
System Overview
Potential Risks
Findings
Appendix 1. Definitions
Appendix 2. Scope
Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Disclaimer

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Introduction

We express our gratitude to the Reactor Trade team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.

PledgeSignature is a signature-based payment authorization system that allows users to execute pledges using either native tokens (ETH) or whitelisted ERC20 tokens. The contract acts as a trustless escrow that validates cryptographically signed authorization from off-chain signers before accepting user payments.

Document

NameSmart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Reactor Trade
Audited ByKornel Światłowski, Ataberk Yavuzer
Approved ByIvan Bondar
Websitehttps://www.reactor.trade/
Changelog05/11/2025 - Preliminary Report
25/11/2025 - Final Report
PlatformEthereum
LanguageSolidity
TagsPayment Gateway, Signatures
Methodologyhttps://docs.hacken.io/methodologies/smart-contracts

Audit Summary

12Total Findings
8Resolved
4Accepted
0Mitigated

The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report

{Finding_Table?columns=title,severity,status&setting.filter.type=Vulnerability}

Documentation quality

  • Functional requirements are not provided.

  • Technical description is not provided.

Code quality

  • The development environment is  not configured.

  • Best practice violations.

  • Insufficient Gas modeling.

Test coverage

Code coverage of the project is 0%.

  • No test suite is provided.

System Overview

PledgeSignature is a signature-based payment authorization system that allows users to execute pledges using either native tokens (ETH) or whitelisted ERC20 tokens. The contract acts as a trustless escrow that validates cryptographically signed authorization from off-chain signers before accepting user payments.

The system integrates with a Rust backend through event emissions, enabling a hybrid on-chain/off-chain architecture where payment authorizations are generated off-chain but executed and enforced on-chain.

PledgeSignature.sol:

The main contract implementing the pledge authorization system with the following key features:

Core Functionality:

  • Signature-based pledges: Users execute pledges by providing a signature from an authorized signer along with payment details

  • Multi-token support: Accepts both native tokens (ETH via address(0)) and whitelisted ERC20 tokens

  • EIP-712 compliance: Uses typed structured data hashing for secure signature verification

  • Replay protection: Implements per-user nonce system to prevent replay attacks

  • Token whitelist: Only pre-approved tokens can be used for pledges

Key Parameters:

  • EIP-712 Domain:

    • Name: "PledgeSignature"

    • Version: "1"

  • Nonce System: Per-user sequential nonces for replay protection

  • Default Whitelisted Token Native token (address(0)) is whitelisted by default

Main Functions:

  • pledgeWithSignature(): Primary function for executing pledges with signature authorization

  • getSignatureHash(): Helper function for off-chain signature generation

  • setTokenWhitelist() / setTokenWhitelistBatch(): Manage approved payment tokens

  • withdraw(): Admin function to extract accumulated funds

  • pause() / unpause(): Emergency circuit breaker functionality

Privileged Roles

The contract implements role-based access control using OpenZeppelin's AccessControl:

DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE

The admin role has the most extensive privileges and complete control over the system:

  • Grant and revoke all roles including SIGNER_ROLE and TOKEN_MANAGER_ROLE

  • Withdraw all accumulated funds (both native and ERC20 tokens) without restrictions

  • Pause and unpause the entire contract, halting all pledge operations

  • Appointed to contract deployer (msg.sender) at deployment

SIGNER_ROLE

Authorized signers can generate valid signatures for pledge transactions:

  • Sign authorization messages that allow users to execute pledges

  • Determine pledge parameters (amounts, tokens, deadlines)

  • Control which transactions are authorized off-chain

TOKEN_MANAGER_ROLE

Token managers control which tokens are accepted for pledges:

  • Add tokens to the whitelist via setTokenWhitelist()

  • Remove tokens from the whitelist

  • Batch whitelist operations via setTokenWhitelistBatch()

Potential Risks

Administrative Key Control Risks: The digital contract architecture relies on administrative keys for critical operations. Centralized control over these keys presents a significant security risk, as compromise or misuse can lead to unauthorized actions or loss of funds.

Findings

Code
Title
Status
Severity
F-2025-1383Unsafe Transfer Method for Native Token Withdrawal
fixed

Low
F-2025-1382Missing Amount Parameter Validation
fixed

Low
F-2025-1382EIP-712 String Encoding Violation
fixed

Low
F-2025-1384No Event Emission on Withdrawal
fixed

Observation
F-2025-1384No Balance Check Before Withdrawal
accepted

Observation
F-2025-1383Gas Optimization Opportunities in Loop
fixed

Observation
F-2025-1383No Duplicate Check in Batch Whitelist Function
fixed

Observation
F-2025-1383No UUID Length Validation
fixed

Observation
F-2025-1383Missing Event Emission in Constructor
accepted

Observation
F-2025-1383Extensive Admin Powers Lead to Centralization Risks
accepted

Observation
1-10 of 12 findings

Identify vulnerabilities in your smart contracts.

Appendix 1. Definitions

Severities

When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.

Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:

Severity

Description

Critical
Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

High
High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

Medium
Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

Low
Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
  • Severity

    Critical

    Description

    Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    High

    Description

    High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    Medium

    Description

    Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

    Severity

    Low

    Description

    Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.

Potential Risks

The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.

Appendix 2. Scope

The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:

Assets in Scope

PledgeSignature.sol - PledgeSignature.sol

Appendix 3. Additional Valuables

Additional Recommendations

The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.

To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:

  • Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.

  • Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.

  • Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.

These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.

Frameworks and Methodologies

This security assessment was conducted in alignment with recognised penetration testing standards, methodologies and guidelines, including the NIST SP 800-115 – Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment , and the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) , These assets provide a structured foundation for planning, executing, and documenting technical evaluations such as vulnerability assessments, exploitation activities, and security code reviews. Hacken’s internal penetration testing methodology extends these principles to Web2 and Web3 environments to ensure consistency, repeatability, and verifiable outcomes.

Disclaimer