Introduction
We express our gratitude to the Dlicom team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.
Dlicom is an ERC20 token with minting and burning capability. It also includes a switch for a marketLaunch.
Document | |
|---|---|
| Name | Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Dlicom |
| Audited By | David Camps Novi |
| Approved By | Olesia Bilenka |
| Website | https://dlicom.io/→ |
| Changelog | 06/02/2026 - Preliminary Report |
| 13/02/2026 - Final Report | |
| Platform | Base |
| Language | Solidity |
| Tags | Fungible Token; Centralization; Upgradable |
| Methodology | https://docs.hacken.io/methodologies/smart-contracts→ |
Document
- Name
- Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Dlicom
- Audited By
- David Camps Novi
- Approved By
- Olesia Bilenka
- Website
- https://dlicom.io/→
- Changelog
- 06/02/2026 - Preliminary Report
- 13/02/2026 - Final Report
- Platform
- Base
- Language
- Solidity
- Tags
- Fungible Token; Centralization; Upgradable
Review Scope | |
|---|---|
| Repository | https://github.com/spl4bs/dlicom-token-sc→ |
| Commit | c1bd927 |
Review Scope
- Commit
- c1bd927
Audit Summary
The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report
{Finding_Table?columns=title,severity,status&setting.filter.type=Vulnerability}
Documentation quality
Functional requirements are provided via NatSpec but no further system description and requirements.
Technical description is missing.
Code quality
The development environment is configured.
Test coverage
Code coverage of the project is 0% (branch coverage).
No tests were provided
System Overview
Dlicom is an ERC20 token with minting and burning capability. It also includes a switch for a marketLaunch.
The system consists of the following contracts:
DLICOM - ERC20 with minting and burning capability, which also includes roles via
AccessControlUpgradeableAccessControlUpgradeable - contract to manage the system roles of the DLICOM token contract.
Privileged roles
DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE - can setup the rest of the system roles via
AccessControlUpgradeable, useburnSupplyFrom()to burn tokens from any address and decrease the tokenMAX_SUPPLYand turn on themarketLaunch.MINTER_ROLE - can mint tokens to any given address, limited to reaching the
MAX_SUPPLYof the token.
Potential Risks
The project's contracts are upgradable, allowing the administrator to update the contract logic at any time. While this provides flexibility in addressing issues and evolving the project, it also introduces risks if upgrade processes are not properly managed or secured, potentially allowing for unauthorized changes that could compromise the project's integrity and security.
The system implements a custom AccessControlUpgradeable contract version, which updated the public visibility of hasRole() to internal. It should be noted that performing this change will limit the capacity for any external source to retrieve the required information since will fail to be accessible via ABI. This may also result in failed compatibility with other systems expecting to be able to reach the result of hasRole() in order to get roles information. At the same time, changing hasRole() visibility to internal is not serving the purpose of hiding or protecting the roles data, since it can still be obtained.
Findings
Code ― | Title | Status | Severity | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| F-2026-1495 | Overprivileged Token Burning Capacity | accepted | Medium | |
| F-2026-1495 | Missing _disableInitializers() in Upgradable Contract Constructor | accepted | Observation | |
| F-2026-1495 | Floating Pragma | accepted | Observation |
Appendix 1. Definitions
Severities
When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.
Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:
Severity | Description |
|---|---|
Critical | Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
High | High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
Medium | Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category. |
Low | Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution. |
Severity
- Critical
Description
- Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- High
Description
- High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- Medium
Description
- Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.
Severity
- Low
Description
- Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
Potential Risks
The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.
Appendix 2. Scope
The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:
Scope Details | |
|---|---|
| Repository | https://github.com/spl4bs/dlicom-token-sc→ |
| Commit | c1bd927 |
| Whitepaper | N/A |
| Requirements | |
| Technical Requirements |
Scope Details
- Commit
- c1bd927
- Whitepaper
- N/A
- Requirements
- Technical Requirements
Assets in Scope
Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Additional Recommendations
The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.
To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:
Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.
Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.
Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.
These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.
Frameworks and Methodologies
This security assessment was conducted in alignment with recognised penetration testing standards, methodologies and guidelines, including the NIST SP 800-115 – Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment →, and the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) →, These assets provide a structured foundation for planning, executing, and documenting technical evaluations such as vulnerability assessments, exploitation activities, and security code reviews. Hacken’s internal penetration testing methodology extends these principles to Web2 and Web3 environments to ensure consistency, repeatability, and verifiable outcomes.