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Audit name:

[SCA] Astra Nova | Rvv-Token | Oct2025

Date:

Nov 6, 2025

Table of Content

Introduction
Audit Summary
System Overview
Potential Risks
Findings
Appendix 1. Definitions
Appendix 2. Scope
Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Disclaimer

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Introduction

We express our gratitude to the Astra Nova team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.

REVIVE Token is a ERC20 token with custom burning functionality, transfer controls, and whitelisting for pre-TGE campaign.

Document

NameSmart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Astra Nova
Audited BySeher Saylik, Kornel Światłowski
Approved ByAtaberk Yavuzer
Websitehttps://astranova.world/
Changelog24/10/2025 - Preliminary Report
06/11/2025 - Final Report
PlatformBSC
LanguageSolidity
TagsERC20, Upgradable
Methodologyhttps://hackenio.cc/sc_methodology
  • Document

    Name
    Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Astra Nova
    Audited By
    Seher Saylik, Kornel Światłowski
    Approved By
    Ataberk Yavuzer
    Changelog
    24/10/2025 - Preliminary Report
    06/11/2025 - Final Report
    Platform
    BSC
    Language
    Solidity
    Tags
    ERC20, Upgradable

Review Scope

Initial scopehttps://bscscan.com/address/0xfb578047aba46ae0b20c0e074ac382e3817b7a9e#code
Repositoryhttps://github.com/Astra-Nova/rvv-token-contracts-v1
Initial commit373989d4ea6e07be8c6fdc2cfc05e2247793d19f
Remediation commit5b5221f23c9407e5abbdd75c271bc3e1d8e39886
Deployed contracthttps://bscscan.com/address/0x03b6df017929f735eb3e8290ca282fa66e351226#code

Audit Summary

6Total Findings
5Resolved
0Accepted
1Mitigated

The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report

{Finding_Table?columns=title,severity,status&setting.filter.type=Vulnerability}

Documentation quality

  • Functional requirements are present, but only at a high-level.

    • Basic system description is provided.

    • Tokenomics is provided and roles are described in the documentation.

  • Technical description is limited.

    • No run instructions.

    • No technical specification.

    • NatSpec is sufficient.

Code quality

  • The development environment is configured.

Test coverage

Code coverage of the project is 94.12% (branch coverage).

  • Deployment and basic user interactions are covered with tests.

  • Missing test run instructions.

System Overview

REVIVE Token is an upgradeable ERC20 token (symbol: RVV) designed to support a controlled pre-TGE (Token Generation Event) campaign. The contract mints a fixed supply of 10 billion tokens to a multisig treasury wallet upon initialization. The core functionality centers around time-gated transfer restrictions: before a configurable timestamp, only whitelisted addresses can transfer tokens, ensuring controlled distribution during the early campaign phase. After this timestamp expires, transfers become unrestricted for all holders.

Privileged roles

The REVIVE Token contract implements multiple privileged roles with distinct capabilities:

  • owner - Inherited from OwnableUpgradeable, with administrative control over:

    • Whitelist Management: Add or remove addresses individually or in batches via addToWhitelist(), removeFromWhitelist(), and batchSetWhitelisted()

    • Transfer Timing Control: Modify the transferAllowedTimestamp through setTransferAllowedTimestamp(), with safeguards preventing extension beyond ETA (original timestamp + 1 day) after the initial period expires

  • treasuryWallet - A designated multisig wallet (intended to be 4-of-6 Gnosis Safe):

    • Token Custody: Receives the entire initial supply of 10 billion tokens upon initialization

    • Protected by onlyMultisig Modifier: Though defined, this modifier is not currently utilized by any functions

  • burnWallet - A dedicated address authorized for token destruction:

    • Burn Authority: Exclusively authorized to call burnFromBurnWallet() to burn tokens from its own balance

  • DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE - Standard OpenZeppelin AccessControlUpgradeable role:

    • Granted to Deployer: Assigned to msg.sender during initialization

    • Currently Unused: No contract functions check for this role, suggesting it may be reserved for future upgrades

Potential Risks

Centralized Minting to a Single Address: The project concentrates minting tokens in a single address, raising the risk of fund mismanagement or theft, especially if key storage security is compromised.

Flexibility and Risk in Contract Upgrades: The project's contracts are upgradable, allowing the administrator to update the contract logic at any time. While this provides flexibility in addressing issues and evolving the project, it also introduces risks if upgrade processes are not properly managed or secured, potentially allowing for unauthorized changes that could compromise the project's integrity and security.

Absence of Upgrade Window Constraints: The contract suite allows for immediate upgrades without a mandatory review or waiting period, increasing the risk of rapid deployment of malicious or flawed code, potentially compromising the system's integrity and user assets.

Findings

Code
Title
Status
Severity
F-2025-1371setTransferAllowedTimestamp Logic Permanently Locks Timestamp Updates After 1 Day Past TGE
fixed

Low
F-2025-1371Misleading NatSpec Comment on _transferAllowedTimestamp Parameter
fixed

Observation
F-2025-1370Missing _disableInitializers() in Upgradable Contract Constructor
fixed

Observation
F-2025-1370Mismatch Between NatSpec Description and Function Logic in burnFromBurnWallet
fixed

Observation
F-2025-1370Unused onlyMultisig Modifier
fixed

Observation
F-2025-1369Duplicate Access Control Implementations Increase Gas Costs
mitigated

Observation
1-6 of 6 findings

Identify vulnerabilities in your smart contracts.

Appendix 1. Definitions

Severities

When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.

Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:

Severity

Description

Critical
Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

High
High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

Medium
Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

Low
Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
  • Severity

    Critical

    Description

    Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    High

    Description

    High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    Medium

    Description

    Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

    Severity

    Low

    Description

    Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.

Potential Risks

The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.

Appendix 2. Scope

The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:

Scope Details

Initial scopehttps://bscscan.com/address/0xfb578047aba46ae0b20c0e074ac382e3817b7a9e#code
Repositoryhttps://github.com/Astra-Nova/rvv-token-contracts-v1
Initial commit373989d4ea6e07be8c6fdc2cfc05e2247793d19f
Remedation commit5b5221f23c9407e5abbdd75c271bc3e1d8e39886
WhitepaperN/A
RequirementsNatSpec
Technical RequirementsNatSpec
Deployed contracthttps://bscscan.com/address/0x03b6df017929f735eb3e8290ca282fa66e351226#code

Assets in Scope

ReviveToken.sol - ReviveToken.sol

Appendix 3. Additional Valuables

Additional Recommendations

The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.

To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:

  • Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.

  • Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.

  • Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.

These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.

Frameworks and Methodologies

This security assessment was conducted in alignment with recognised penetration testing standards, methodologies and guidelines, including the NIST SP 800-115 – Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment , and the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) , These assets provide a structured foundation for planning, executing, and documenting technical evaluations such as vulnerability assessments, exploitation activities, and security code reviews. Hacken’s internal penetration testing methodology extends these principles to Web2 and Web3 environments to ensure consistency, repeatability, and verifiable outcomes.

Disclaimer