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Audit name:

[SCA] Constellation Network | Staking | Jul2021

Date:

Jul 10, 2021

Table of Content

Introduction
System Overview
Potential Risks
Findings
Appendix 1. Definitions
Appendix 2. Scope
Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Disclaimer

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Introduction

We express our gratitude to the Constellation Network team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.

Document

NameSmart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Constellation Network
Audited ByHacken
Approved ByHacken
Changelog29/07/2021 – 09/07/2021
PlatformEthereum
LanguageSolidity
TagsStaking Pool
Methodologyhttps://hackenio.cc/sc_methodology
  • Document

    Name
    Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Constellation Network
    Audited By
    Hacken
    Approved By
    Hacken
    Changelog
    29/07/2021 – 09/07/2021
    Platform
    Ethereum
    Language
    Solidity
    Tags
    Staking Pool

System Overview

PROJECT_NAME is a staking protocol with the following contracts:

Token  — simple ERC-20 token that mints all initial supply to a deployer. Additional minting is not allowed.

It has the following attributes:

  • Name: TokenName

  • Symbol: TST

  • Decimals: 18

  • Total supply: 100m tokens.

Staking — a contract that rewards users for staking their tokens. APY depends on the tokens provided by the owner and could not be calculated before reward tokens are deposited.

Privileged roles

  • The owner of the contract can arbitrarily add, delete and modify the addresses stored. It is therefore entitled to impersonate or change the logic of critical components of the system at will.

  • The owner can revoke a vesting if upon creation such a parameter was provided. On revoking all vested tokens till the moment are automatically released to the beneficiary account.

Potential Risks

Iterating over a dynamic array populated with custom tokenId can lead to gas limit denial of service if the number of tokenId goes out of control.

Findings

Code
Title
Status
Severity
F-2021-0107Possible unreachable view function
fixed

Medium
F-2021-010Multiple access to state variable
fixed

Low
I-2021-010Maximum line size
unfixed

Observation
I-2021-010Code optimization
fixed

Observation
I-2021-0101Boolean equality
fixed

Observation
1-5 of 5 findings

Identify vulnerabilities in your smart contracts.

Appendix 1. Definitions

Severities

When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.

Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:

Severity

Description

Critical
Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

High
High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

Medium
Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

Low
Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
  • Severity

    Critical

    Description

    Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    High

    Description

    High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    Medium

    Description

    Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

    Severity

    Low

    Description

    Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.

Potential Risks

The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.

Appendix 2. Scope

The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:

Scope Details

Repositoryhttps://github.com/hknio
Commitf185c31beaace0671972d1c2c5be6ea67a8a55e9
Whitepaperhttps://hackenio.cc/hacken-methodologies
Requirements
Technical Requirements

Assets in Scope

Depooyed contract - Depooyed contract

Appendix 3. Additional Valuables

Verification of System Invariants

During the audit of Project/Client Name], Hacken followed its methodology by performing fuzz-testing on the project's main functions. [Echidna , a tool used for fuzz-testing, was employed to check how the protocol behaves under various inputs. Due to the complex and dynamic interactions within the protocol, unexpected edge cases might arise. Therefore, it was important to use fuzz-testing to ensure that several system invariants hold true in all situations.

Fuzz-testing allows the input of many random data points into the system, helping to identify issues that regular testing might miss. A specific Echidna fuzzing suite was prepared for this task, and throughout the assessment, [Number of Invariants] invariants were tested over 5,000,000 runs. This thorough testing ensured that the system works correctly even with unexpected or unusual inputs.

Invariant

Test Result

Run Count

Debt should never decrease on openPassed1M+
Debt should never increase on closePassed2M+
Total position must decrease accordingly on closeFailed2M+
Close should never decrease user reserve balancesFailed1M+
Expiry must be in the futurePassed2M+
  • Invariant

    Debt should never decrease on open

    Test Result

    Passed

    Run Count

    1M+

    Invariant

    Debt should never increase on close

    Test Result

    Passed

    Run Count

    2M+

    Invariant

    Total position must decrease accordingly on close

    Test Result

    Failed

    Run Count

    2M+

    Invariant

    Close should never decrease user reserve balances

    Test Result

    Failed

    Run Count

    1M+

    Invariant

    Expiry must be in the future

    Test Result

    Passed

    Run Count

    2M+

Additional Recommendations

The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.

To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:

  • Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.

  • Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.

  • Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.

These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.

Disclaimer