Audit name:
[SCA] Polyverse / Polyverse-Contracts / Mar2025
Date:
Mar 26, 2025
Table of Content
Introduction
We express our gratitude to the Polyverse team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.
In the rapidly evolving world of digital art and collectables, Polyverse has emerged as a pioneer, simplifying the process of minting and launching Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs).
Document | |
|---|---|
| Name | Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Polyverse |
| Audited By | Seher Saylik, Nataliia Balashova |
| Approved By | Ivan Bondar |
| Website | https://stake.polyverse.gg/→ |
| Changelog | 19/03/2025 - Preliminary Report |
| 26/03/2025 - Final Report | |
| Platform | EVM |
| Language | Ethereum |
| Tags | Vesting, ERC20 |
| Methodology | https://hackenio.cc/sc_methodology→ |
Document
- Name
- Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Polyverse
- Audited By
- Seher Saylik, Nataliia Balashova
- Approved By
- Ivan Bondar
- Website
- https://stake.polyverse.gg/→
- Changelog
- 19/03/2025 - Preliminary Report
- 26/03/2025 - Final Report
- Platform
- EVM
- Language
- Ethereum
- Tags
- Vesting, ERC20
- Methodology
- https://hackenio.cc/sc_methodology→
Review Scope | |
|---|---|
| Repository | https://gitlab.com/taco-wax/polyverse/audit→ |
| Commit | beb53a5e740d6af5c0c07630ca0df9e97283d382 |
| Retest | 2432123ef70436a65c9090dc6e4508f07bb4617f |
Review Scope
- Commit
- beb53a5e740d6af5c0c07630ca0df9e97283d382
- Retest
- 2432123ef70436a65c9090dc6e4508f07bb4617f
Audit Summary
The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report
Documentation quality
Functional requirements are not provided.
Technical description is not provided.
Code quality
The code adapts some inefficient usages.
The development environment is partially configured.
Test coverage
Code coverage of the project is 0% (branch coverage).
Tests were not provided.
System Overview
PolyVerse is a vesting protocol with the following contracts:
PTest — simple ERC-20 token that mints an initial supply to a deployer. Additional minting is allowed.
It has the following attributes:
Name: specified at deployment
Symbol: specified at deployment
Decimals: 18
Total supply: not capped.
PolyverseTokenVesting — a token vesting mechanism where users receive an initial allocation at the token generation event (TGE) and additional tokens that vest over time based on predefined timestamps. Users can claim their vested tokens after the corresponding vesting periods, while the contract tracks both the TGE allocation and any remaining unclaimed tokens, and it allows the owner to add further vesting schedules.
Privileged roles
The owner of the PTest contract can mint new tokens.
The owner of the PolyverseTokenVesting can add further vesting schedules for users.
Potential Risks
If a user accumulates a sufficiently large number of distribution instances, the unbounded loop in the claim() function may exceed gas limits, causing transaction failure and potentially resulting in a denial-of-service.
There is a possible risk for users that if manual token transfers are mismanaged or delayed, the contract may not hold enough tokens to cover all vesting obligations, potentially leading to incomplete token disbursements.
Centralized Minting to a Single Address: The project concentrates minting tokens in a single address, raising the risk of fund mismanagement or theft, especially if key storage security is compromised.
Centralized Control of Minting Process: The token contract’s design allows for centralized control over the minting process, posing a risk of unauthorized token issuance, potentially diluting the token value and undermining trust in the project's economic governance.
Unrestricted minting of tokens without a cap post-deployment carries risks such as token dilution, market manipulation, and potential regulatory consequences.
Findings
Code ― | Title | Status | Severity | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| F-2025-9213 | Uncapped Minting and Inflation Risk | accepted | Low | |
| F-2025-9206 | Incorrect Zero Address Validation in Constructor’s Second Loop | fixed | Low | |
| F-2025-9220 | Inefficient Storage Use for owner and tokenAddress Variables | fixed | Observation | |
| F-2025-9209 | Inefficient Storage Management (State Bloat) | accepted | Observation | |
| F-2025-9208 | Public Functions that Can be External | fixed | Observation | |
| F-2025-9207 | Missing Event Emission for State Changes | accepted | Observation | |
| F-2025-9205 | Unused Import | fixed | Observation |
Identify vulnerabilities in your smart contracts.
Appendix 1. Definitions
Severities
When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.
Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:
Severity | Description |
|---|---|
Critical | Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
High | High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
Medium | Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category. |
Low | Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution. |
Severity
- Critical
Description
- Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- High
Description
- High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- Medium
Description
- Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.
Severity
- Low
Description
- Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
Potential Risks
The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.
Appendix 2. Scope
The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:
Scope Details | |
|---|---|
| Repository | https://gitlab.com/taco-wax/polyverse/audit→ |
| Commit | beb53a5e740d6af5c0c07630ca0df9e97283d382 |
| Retest | 2432123ef70436a65c9090dc6e4508f07bb4617f |
| Whitepaper | N/A |
| Requirements | N/A |
| Technical Requirements | N/A |
Scope Details
- Commit
- beb53a5e740d6af5c0c07630ca0df9e97283d382
- Retest
- 2432123ef70436a65c9090dc6e4508f07bb4617f
- Whitepaper
- N/A
- Requirements
- N/A
- Technical Requirements
- N/A
Assets in Scope
PolyverseTokenVesting.solPTEST.sol Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Additional Recommendations
The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.
To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:
Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.
Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.
Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.
These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.