Introduction
We express our gratitude to the ZimX Finance team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.
ZimX Finance is digital payments infrastructure for the UK-Zimbabwe remittance corridor.
Document | |
|---|---|
| Name | Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for ZimX Finance |
| Audited By | Khrystyna Tkachuk |
| Approved By | Seher Saylik |
| Website | https://www.zimx.finance/→ |
| Changelog | 01/04/2026 - Preliminary Report |
| 15/05/2026 - Final Report | |
| Platform | Base |
| Language | Solidity |
| Tags | Fungible Token, ERC20, Governance |
| Methodology | https://docs.hacken.io/methodologies/smart-contracts→ |
Document
- Name
- Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for ZimX Finance
- Audited By
- Khrystyna Tkachuk
- Approved By
- Seher Saylik
- Website
- https://www.zimx.finance/→
- Changelog
- 01/04/2026 - Preliminary Report
- 15/05/2026 - Final Report
- Platform
- Base
- Language
- Solidity
- Tags
- Fungible Token, ERC20, Governance
Review Scope | |
|---|---|
| Repository | https://github.com/zimxfinance/Zimx→ |
| Initial Commit | 930ac7f |
| Final Commit | 46a4332 |
Review Scope
- Repository
- https://github.com/zimxfinance/Zimx→
- Initial Commit
- 930ac7f
- Final Commit
- 46a4332
Audit Summary
The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report
{Finding_Table?columns=title,severity,status&setting.filter.type=Vulnerability}
Documentation quality
Functional requirements are detailed.
Project overview is detailed.
All roles in the system are described.
Use cases are described.
Technical description is robust.
Run instructions are provided.
The NatSpec documentation is sufficient.
Code quality
The code leverages OpenZeppelin contracts and follows established patterns.
The development environment is configured.
Test coverage
Code coverage of the project is 92.59% (branch coverage).
Deployment and basic user interactions are covered.
Interactions by several users are not covered thoroughly.
Negative test cases are covered.
System Overview
The ZIMXToken is an ERC-20 utility token deployed with a fixed total supply. The contract inherits from OpenZeppelin's ERC20, ERC20Burnable, Pausable, and ERC20Permit, providing standard token functionality alongside gasless approval via EIP-2612 signatures and the ability for any token holder to burn their own tokens.
The ZIMXToken token contract has the following attributes:
Name: ZIMX Token
Symbol: ZIMX
Decimals: 6
Total supply: 1 000 000 000 tokens.
The contract implements a multi-role governance model with three privileged addresses — governance, timelock, and guardian — each with a distinct scope of authority. At deployment, the entire supply is minted to a designated treasury wallet, and subsequent distributions are performed through a purpose-built distributeFromTreasury() function that emits telemetry events for on-chain allocation tracking. The treasury address can be updated until it is permanently sealed via sealTreasury(), after which it becomes immutable.
A unique feature is the On-Chain Promises system: the timelock can record human-readable commitments on-chain with Pending, Kept, or Broken statuses, intended as a transparency mechanism for the community. The contract also includes a pause mechanism that halts all token transfers (including minting and burning) and a recoverERC20() function to rescue tokens accidentally sent to the contract address.
Per the project documentation the timelock address is intended to be an OpenZeppelin TimelockController with a meaningful minimum delay, and governance is intended to be a Gnosis Safe multisig. Under this architecture, governance proposes operations to the TimelockController, which schedules them and enforces the delay before execution.
Governance transfer follows a two-step pattern: a transfer is initiated (setting a pendingGovernance), and the new address must call acceptGovernance() to complete the handover. This mitigates the risk of transferring control to an incorrect address.
Privileged roles
governance: Controls pause/unpause of all token transfers. Intended to be a multisig. Receives rescued ERC-20 tokens.timelock: Controls governance transfers, treasury updates, treasury sealing, treasury distributions, ERC-20 recovery, on-chain promise management, and direct setter functions for all three privileged addressesguardian: A narrowly scoped emergency role that can only callguardianUnpause()to resume token transfers. Intended as a safety valve if governance is unavailable during a pause. Unset at deployment, zero address by default.pendingGovernance: A transient role representing the address nominated to become the new governance. Must callacceptGovernance()to finalize the transfer.
Potential Risks
Scope Definition and Security Guarantees: The audit does not cover all code in the repository. Contracts outside the audit scope may introduce vulnerabilities, potentially impacting the overall security due to the interconnected nature of smart contracts.
Centralized Minting to a Single Address: The project concentrates minting tokens in a single address, raising the risk of fund mismanagement or theft, especially if key storage security is compromised.
Single Points of Failure and Control: The project is fully or partially centralized, introducing single points of failure and control. This centralization can lead to vulnerabilities in decision-making and operational processes, making the system more susceptible to targeted attacks or manipulation.
Unenforced Timelock Trust Assumption: The ZIMXToken assumes the timelock address is a properly configured OpenZeppelin TimelockController with the intended delay. However, the timelock contract is out of scope, and ZIMXToken contract does not verify that the configured address is actually a TimelockController or that the expected minimum delay is enforced. As a result, the security of onlyTimelock functions depends on an external assumption that is not enforced on-chain.
Findings
Code ― | Title | Status | Severity | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| F-2026-1564 | Timelock Initialized to Governance Address, Bypassing All Time-Delay Enforcement at Deployment | fixed | Medium | |
| F-2026-1563 | Allowance Bypass in distributeFromTreasury Allows Arbitrary Token Theft | fixed | Medium | |
| F-2026-1566 | Governance Transfer Does Not Enforce a Timelock Delay Between Proposal and Acceptance | fixed | Low | |
| F-2026-1565 | Promise Status Update Allows Reversal of Terminal States | fixed | Low | |
| F-2026-1565 | Redundant Overloaded Events Emitted in the Same Transaction Increase Gas Cost and Risk Indexing Failures | fixed | Low | |
| F-2026-1563 | Two-Step Governance Transfer Can Be Bypassed Through Direct Governance Reassignment | fixed | Low | |
| F-2026-1562 | Unsafe ERC-20 Transfer in recoverERC20 | fixed | Low | |
| F-2026-1565 | Inconsistent Error Handling Pattern Reduces Codebase Consistency and Gas Efficiency | fixed | Observation | |
| F-2026-1564 | Redundant Unpause Entry Points With Identical Logic | fixed | Observation | |
| F-2026-1563 | Identical Function Declarations Increase Code Complexity | fixed | Observation |
Appendix 1. Definitions
Severities
When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.
Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:
Severity | Description |
|---|---|
Critical | Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
High | High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
Medium | Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category. |
Low | Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution. |
Severity
- Critical
Description
- Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- High
Description
- High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- Medium
Description
- Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.
Severity
- Low
Description
- Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
Potential Risks
The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.
Appendix 2. Scope
The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:
Scope Details | |
|---|---|
| Repository | https://github.com/zimxfinance/Zimx→ |
| Initial Commit | 930ac7fe9b5713cd85e98aaaa68f861006202afb |
| Final Commit | 46a433299159c4d957681f5cb7e8b0686770396e |
| Whitepaper | https://zimx.io/whitepaper/→ |
| Requirements | Readme.md |
| Technical Requirements | Readme.md |
Scope Details
- Repository
- https://github.com/zimxfinance/Zimx→
- Initial Commit
- 930ac7fe9b5713cd85e98aaaa68f861006202afb
- Final Commit
- 46a433299159c4d957681f5cb7e8b0686770396e
- Whitepaper
- https://zimx.io/whitepaper/→
- Requirements
- Readme.md
- Technical Requirements
- Readme.md
Assets in Scope
Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Additional Recommendations
The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.
To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:
Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.
Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.
Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.
These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.
Frameworks and Methodologies
This security assessment was conducted in alignment with recognised penetration testing standards, methodologies and guidelines, including the NIST SP 800-115 – Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment →, and the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) →, These assets provide a structured foundation for planning, executing, and documenting technical evaluations such as vulnerability assessments, exploitation activities, and security code reviews. Hacken’s internal penetration testing methodology extends these principles to Web2 and Web3 environments to ensure consistency, repeatability, and verifiable outcomes.