Q1 2026 Security & Compliance Report44 incidents, $482M in losses, insights from 11 industry leaders.
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Audit name:

[SCA] Zimx Finance | Dual Token | Apr2026

Date:

Apr 15, 2026

Table of Content

Introduction
Audit Summary
System Overview
Potential Risks
Findings
Appendix 1. Definitions
Appendix 2. Scope
Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Disclaimer

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Introduction

We express our gratitude to the ZimX Finance team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.

ZimX Finance is digital payments infrastructure for the UK-Zimbabwe remittance corridor.

Document

NameSmart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for ZimX Finance
Audited ByKhrystyna Tkachuk
Approved BySeher Saylik
Websitehttps://www.zimx.finance/
Changelog01/04/2026 - Preliminary Report
15/05/2026 - Final Report
PlatformBase
LanguageSolidity
TagsFungible Token, ERC20, Governance
Methodologyhttps://docs.hacken.io/methodologies/smart-contracts

Review Scope

Repositoryhttps://github.com/zimxfinance/Zimx
Initial Commit930ac7f
Final Commit46a4332

Audit Summary

14Total Findings
14Resolved
0Accepted
0Mitigated

The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report

{Finding_Table?columns=title,severity,status&setting.filter.type=Vulnerability}

Documentation quality

  • Functional requirements are detailed.

    • Project overview is detailed.

    • All roles in the system are described.

    • Use cases are described.

  • Technical description is robust.

    • Run instructions are provided.

    • The NatSpec documentation is sufficient.

Code quality

  • The code leverages OpenZeppelin contracts and follows established patterns.

  • The development environment is configured.

Test coverage

Code coverage of the project is 92.59% (branch coverage).

  • Deployment and basic user interactions are covered.

  • Interactions by several users are not covered thoroughly.

  • Negative test cases are covered.

System Overview

The ZIMXToken is an ERC-20 utility token deployed with a fixed total supply. The contract inherits from OpenZeppelin's ERC20, ERC20Burnable, Pausable, and ERC20Permit, providing standard token functionality alongside gasless approval via EIP-2612 signatures and the ability for any token holder to burn their own tokens.

The ZIMXToken token contract  has the following attributes:

  • Name: ZIMX Token

  • Symbol: ZIMX

  • Decimals: 6

  • Total supply: 1 000 000 000 tokens.

The contract implements a multi-role governance model with three privileged addresses — governance, timelock, and guardian — each with a distinct scope of authority. At deployment, the entire supply is minted to a designated treasury wallet, and subsequent distributions are performed through a purpose-built distributeFromTreasury() function that emits telemetry events for on-chain allocation tracking. The treasury address can be updated until it is permanently sealed via sealTreasury(), after which it becomes immutable.

A unique feature is the On-Chain Promises system: the timelock can record human-readable commitments on-chain with Pending, Kept, or Broken statuses, intended as a transparency mechanism for the community. The contract also includes a pause mechanism that halts all token transfers (including minting and burning) and a recoverERC20() function to rescue tokens accidentally sent to the contract address.

Per the project documentation the timelock address is intended to be an OpenZeppelin TimelockController with a meaningful minimum delay, and governance is intended to be a Gnosis Safe multisig. Under this architecture, governance proposes operations to the TimelockController, which schedules them and enforces the delay before execution.

Governance transfer follows a two-step pattern: a transfer is initiated (setting a pendingGovernance), and the new address must call acceptGovernance() to complete the handover. This mitigates the risk of transferring control to an incorrect address.

Privileged roles

  • governance: Controls pause/unpause of all token transfers. Intended to be a multisig. Receives rescued ERC-20 tokens.

  • timelock: Controls governance transfers, treasury updates, treasury sealing, treasury distributions, ERC-20 recovery, on-chain promise management, and direct setter functions for all three privileged addresses

  • guardian: A narrowly scoped emergency role that can only call guardianUnpause() to resume token transfers. Intended as a safety valve if governance is unavailable during a pause. Unset at deployment, zero address by default.

  • pendingGovernance: A transient role representing the address nominated to become the new governance. Must call acceptGovernance() to finalize the transfer.

Potential Risks

Scope Definition and Security Guarantees: The audit does not cover all code in the repository. Contracts outside the audit scope may introduce vulnerabilities, potentially impacting the overall security due to the interconnected nature of smart contracts.

Centralized Minting to a Single Address: The project concentrates minting tokens in a single address, raising the risk of fund mismanagement or theft, especially if key storage security is compromised.

Single Points of Failure and Control: The project is fully or partially centralized, introducing single points of failure and control. This centralization can lead to vulnerabilities in decision-making and operational processes, making the system more susceptible to targeted attacks or manipulation.

Unenforced Timelock Trust Assumption:  The ZIMXToken assumes the timelock address is a properly configured OpenZeppelin TimelockController with the intended delay. However, the timelock contract is out of scope, and ZIMXToken contract does not verify that the configured address is actually a TimelockController or that the expected minimum delay is enforced. As a result, the security of onlyTimelock functions depends on an external assumption that is not enforced on-chain.

Findings

Code
Title
Status
Severity
F-2026-1564Timelock Initialized to Governance Address, Bypassing All Time-Delay Enforcement at Deployment
fixed

Medium
F-2026-1563Allowance Bypass in distributeFromTreasury Allows Arbitrary Token Theft
fixed

Medium
F-2026-1566Governance Transfer Does Not Enforce a Timelock Delay Between Proposal and Acceptance
fixed

Low
F-2026-1565Promise Status Update Allows Reversal of Terminal States
fixed

Low
F-2026-1565Redundant Overloaded Events Emitted in the Same Transaction Increase Gas Cost and Risk Indexing Failures
fixed

Low
F-2026-1563Two-Step Governance Transfer Can Be Bypassed Through Direct Governance Reassignment
fixed

Low
F-2026-1562Unsafe ERC-20 Transfer in recoverERC20
fixed

Low
F-2026-1565Inconsistent Error Handling Pattern Reduces Codebase Consistency and Gas Efficiency
fixed

Observation
F-2026-1564Redundant Unpause Entry Points With Identical Logic
fixed

Observation
F-2026-1563Identical Function Declarations Increase Code Complexity
fixed

Observation
1-10 of 14 findings

Identify vulnerabilities in your smart contracts.

Appendix 1. Definitions

Severities

When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.

Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:

Severity

Description

Critical
Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

High
High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

Medium
Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

Low
Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
  • Severity

    Critical

    Description

    Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    High

    Description

    High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    Medium

    Description

    Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

    Severity

    Low

    Description

    Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.

Potential Risks

The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.

Appendix 2. Scope

The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:

Scope Details

Repositoryhttps://github.com/zimxfinance/Zimx
Initial Commit930ac7fe9b5713cd85e98aaaa68f861006202afb
Final Commit46a433299159c4d957681f5cb7e8b0686770396e
Whitepaperhttps://zimx.io/whitepaper/
RequirementsReadme.md
Technical RequirementsReadme.md

Assets in Scope

ZIMXToken.sol - ZIMXToken.sol

Appendix 3. Additional Valuables

Additional Recommendations

The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.

To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:

  • Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.

  • Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.

  • Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.

These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.

Frameworks and Methodologies

This security assessment was conducted in alignment with recognised penetration testing standards, methodologies and guidelines, including the NIST SP 800-115 – Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment , and the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) , These assets provide a structured foundation for planning, executing, and documenting technical evaluations such as vulnerability assessments, exploitation activities, and security code reviews. Hacken’s internal penetration testing methodology extends these principles to Web2 and Web3 environments to ensure consistency, repeatability, and verifiable outcomes.

Disclaimer