Q1 2026 Security & Compliance Report44 incidents, $482M in losses, insights from 11 industry leaders.
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Audit name:

[L1] Push Chain | Blockchain Audit | Apr2026

Date:

Jun 3, 2026

Table of Content

Introduction
Audit Summary
System Overview
Risks
Findings
Appendix 1. Severity Definitions
Appendix 2. Scope
Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Disclaimer

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Introduction

We express our gratitude to the PushChain team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Blockchain Protocol Security Assessment.

Push Chain is a shared-state Layer 1 that brings together Cosmos-style blockchain infrastructure with full Ethereum app compatibility, so developers can build in familiar tools while the chain coordinates activity across networks. Rather than connecting chains one bridge at a time, Push acts as a central hub where cross-chain actions are observed, agreed on, and executed—enabling universal applications that can reach users and assets on many chains from one place.

Document

NameBlockchain Protocol Review and Security Analysis Report for PushChain
Audited ByTanuj Soni, Alfredo Ortega
Approved ByEce Örsel
Websitehttps://push.org/
Changelog15/05/2026 - Preliminary Report
Changelog05/06/2026 - Second Preliminary Report
Changelog19/06/2026 - Final Report
PlatformPushChain
LanguageGolang
TagsCosmos SDK, EVM compatible, Cross-chain hub
Methodologyhttps://docs.hacken.io/methodologies/blockchain-protocols
  • Document

    Name
    Blockchain Protocol Review and Security Analysis Report for PushChain
    Audited By
    Tanuj Soni, Alfredo Ortega
    Approved By
    Ece Örsel
    Changelog
    15/05/2026 - Preliminary Report
    Changelog
    05/06/2026 - Second Preliminary Report
    Changelog
    19/06/2026 - Final Report
    Platform
    PushChain
    Language
    Golang
    Tags
    Cosmos SDK, EVM compatible, Cross-chain hub

Audit Summary

58Total Findings
44Resolved
10Accepted
1Mitigated

The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report

{FindingsVulnSeverityStatusTable}

Documentation quality

  • The root readme.md provides a concise product overview, environment prerequisites, local network startup guidance, and a repository layout. It does not articulate functional requirements, explicit security assumptions, or normative guarantees for cross-chain execution paths.

  • Documentation for the custom modules (x/uexecutor, x/uregistry, x/uvalidator, x/utss) is largely introductory. It does not systematically document message lifecycles, failure and recovery behavior, voting or quorum semantics, or administrative control boundaries to a level typically expected for independent protocol review.

  • A consolidated technical specification covering trust model, finality and confirmation policy, upgrade authority, and state-transition invariants—is not present as a standalone deliverable. Protocol behavior is inferred primarily from source code and protobuf definitions the latter describe data shapes but do not substitute for a full protocol specification. chain_metadata.json includes placeholder or non-specific external references, which is consistent with metadata that has not been finalized for production publication.

Code quality

  • The implementation builds on established Cosmos SDK and Cosmos EVM components in a conventional manner. Push-specific EVM system contracts are integrated using widely used proxy patterns, with contract bytecode embedded in the registry module rather than distributed as a separately versioned contract package.

  • Some module scaffolding remains (for example unwired or placeholder migrations and example chain metadata). If activated or merged without additional review, such artifacts can increase operational and maintenance risk.

  • The universal modules and Universal Client introduce substantial custom logic. Cross-cutting concerns including hash normalization, ballot or observation identity, and oracle-related updates—are not uniformly enforced across all components, which can complicate reasoning about end-to-end behavior.

  • The repository provides a workable development setup: Makefile, Docker-oriented tooling, local and testnet-oriented scripts, and stated prerequisites (Go 1.23+, Docker, jq).

Architecture quality

  • Scalability: The network is implemented as a single CometBFT-based L1 without sharding. Capacity is bounded by block limits, EVM execution cost, and off-chain operator throughput. Certain on-chain bookkeeping paths rely on linear scans over growing state, which may become a scaling consideration as history accumulates.

  • Decentralization: Consensus follows a standard validator model. Cross-chain operation additionally depends on a distinct universal-validator role, registry-defined routing and asset policy, and EVM-layer upgrade control for system contracts. Together, these introduce administrative and operational trust assumptions beyond the base staking layer.

  • Interoperability: The design targets interoperability via IBC, EVM interfaces, CosmWasm, and hub-style connectivity to external EVM and Solana networks through Universal Client. Cross-chain settlement is attestation-based and configuration-dependent rather than light-client–verified on a per-event basis.

  • Resilience: End-to-end resilience of cross-chain flows is not fully evidenced by the reviewed materials. Operational availability depends on Universal Client processes, external RPC reliability, and alignment between staking-derived validator state and universal-validator registry state. EVM system-contract upgrade authority represents a concentrated dependency in the overall architecture.

System Overview

Push Chain is a Cosmos SDK Layer 1 on CometBFT with native EVM and CosmWasm support. The node binary is pchaind the native token is upc. Alongside standard Cosmos, EVM, IBC, and token-factory modules, the chain adds four custom modules for universal cross-chain apps: registry, validator voting, on-chain execution, and threshold-signing coordination.

External chains connect through a hub model: operators run puniversald to observe events, validators vote them into consensus, Push executes the workflow (including EVM), and signed transactions complete actions on destination chains. Selected user and validator transactions can be processed without gas fees when they use only approved message types.

Custom Modules

  • Universal Client (universalClient ) Off-chain service run by universal validators alongside pchaind. Watches external chains (EVM and Solana), submits vote transactions to Push, and collectively signs outbound transactions via threshold cryptography so no single operator holds full signing authority. Persists the chain-specific state locally and coordinates TSS sessions between validators.

  • Universal Registry (x/uregistry) Defines which external chains, tokens, and gateways Push recognizes. Administrators manage this configuration; execution modules reject operations on unsupported or disabled routes.

  • Universal Validator (x/uvalidator) Maintains the universal validator set and runs ballot voting on cross-chain observations. When enough validators agree, results are passed to the executor and TSS modules.

  • Universal Executor (x/uexecutor) Runs universal workflows on Push: processing inbounds from other chains, tracking transaction status, executing user payloads, and handling outbounds. Integrates with the EVM layer for contracts and account logic.

  • Universal TSS (x/utss) Coordinates threshold signing and fund migration when validator keys rotate. On-chain votes align with off-chain signing performed by Universal Client operators.

EVM Precompiles

Push extends the standard EVM precompile set so Solidity can call into Cosmos: bech32, p256, staking, distribution, IBC transfer, bank, gov, slashing, and evidence.

Push also adds usigverifier, which lets contracts verify signatures from supported external chains (e.g. Ed25519).

Risks

Core cross-chain contracts can be upgraded outside normal Cosmos governance; misuse could change system behavior and affect bridged assets.

Settlement still relies on validator agreement, with limited automatic protection against incorrect votes.

Key-management steps that need full participant agreement can stall if someone does not take part.

Events may be recorded before they are fully settled elsewhere, which can lead to later mismatches with source chains.

Accounts are tied to each source chain and owner, not automatically to one identity across all chains.

Findings

Code
Title
Status
Severity
F-2026-1659Arbitrary memory allocation at UniversalClient
fixed

High
F-2026-1696[PUSHCHAIN REPORTED] Issue 4 — EVM TX resolver marks “Tx not found” as reverted (double-spend edge case)
fixed

High
F-2026-1694Iterator Invalidation in PruneValidatorVotes
unfixed

Medium
F-2026-1674Solana RPC Signature Order Misassumption
fixed

Medium
F-2026-1673ExecuteInboundFundsAndPayload State Desync
fixed

Medium
F-2026-1699Hardcoded EOA as owner of every system-contract ProxyAdmin
accepted

Medium
F-2026-1696[PUSHCHAIN-REPORTED] Issue 7 — Expiry sweeper votes REVERT based on push chain state, not observed chain state and can result into false voting
fixed

Medium
F-2026-1696[PUSHCHAIN-REPORTED] Issue 3 — Fund migration broadcast retry storm after peer already migrated funds
fixed

Medium
F-2026-1696[PUSHCHAIN REPORTED] Issue 2 — Fund migration failure due to hardcoded GasLimit and missing L1GasFeeBuffer
fixed

Medium
F-2026-1696[PUSHCHAIN-REPORTED] Issue 1: RPC failover retries same endpoint under concurrent load
fixed

Medium
1-10 of 58 findings

Findings like these can secure your blockchain.

Appendix 1. Severity Definitions

Severity

Description

Critical
Vulnerabilities that can lead to a complete breakdown of the blockchain network's security, privacy, integrity, or availability fall under this category. They can disrupt the consensus mechanism, enabling a malicious entity to take control of the majority of nodes or facilitate 51% attacks. In addition, issues that could lead to widespread crashing of nodes, leading to a complete breakdown or significant halt of the network, are also considered critical along with issues that can lead to a massive theft of assets. Immediate attention and mitigation are required.

High
High severity vulnerabilities are those that do not immediately risk the complete security or integrity of the network but can cause substantial harm. These are issues that could cause the crashing of several nodes, leading to temporary disruption of the network, or could manipulate the consensus mechanism to a certain extent, but not enough to execute a 51% attack. Partial breaches of privacy, unauthorized but limited access to sensitive information, and affecting the reliable execution of smart contracts also fall under this category.

Medium
Medium severity vulnerabilities could negatively affect the blockchain protocol but are usually not capable of causing catastrophic damage. These could include vulnerabilities that allow minor breaches of user privacy, can slow down transaction processing, or can lead to relatively small financial losses. It may be possible to exploit these vulnerabilities under specific circumstances, or they may require a high level of access to exploit effectively.

Low
Low severity vulnerabilities are minor flaws in the blockchain protocol that might not have a direct impact on security but could cause minor inefficiencies in transaction processing or slight delays in block propagation. They might include vulnerabilities that allow attackers to cause nuisance-level disruptions or are only exploitable under extremely rare and specific conditions. These vulnerabilities should be corrected but do not represent an immediate threat to the system.
  • Severity

    Critical

    Description

    Vulnerabilities that can lead to a complete breakdown of the blockchain network's security, privacy, integrity, or availability fall under this category. They can disrupt the consensus mechanism, enabling a malicious entity to take control of the majority of nodes or facilitate 51% attacks. In addition, issues that could lead to widespread crashing of nodes, leading to a complete breakdown or significant halt of the network, are also considered critical along with issues that can lead to a massive theft of assets. Immediate attention and mitigation are required.

    Severity

    High

    Description

    High severity vulnerabilities are those that do not immediately risk the complete security or integrity of the network but can cause substantial harm. These are issues that could cause the crashing of several nodes, leading to temporary disruption of the network, or could manipulate the consensus mechanism to a certain extent, but not enough to execute a 51% attack. Partial breaches of privacy, unauthorized but limited access to sensitive information, and affecting the reliable execution of smart contracts also fall under this category.

    Severity

    Medium

    Description

    Medium severity vulnerabilities could negatively affect the blockchain protocol but are usually not capable of causing catastrophic damage. These could include vulnerabilities that allow minor breaches of user privacy, can slow down transaction processing, or can lead to relatively small financial losses. It may be possible to exploit these vulnerabilities under specific circumstances, or they may require a high level of access to exploit effectively.

    Severity

    Low

    Description

    Low severity vulnerabilities are minor flaws in the blockchain protocol that might not have a direct impact on security but could cause minor inefficiencies in transaction processing or slight delays in block propagation. They might include vulnerabilities that allow attackers to cause nuisance-level disruptions or are only exploitable under extremely rare and specific conditions. These vulnerabilities should be corrected but do not represent an immediate threat to the system.

Appendix 2. Scope

The scope of the project includes the following components from the provided repository:

Assets in Scope

https:
github.com
pushchain
push-chain-node
tree
audit-main
x
uexecutor - https: › › github.com › pushchain › push-chain-node › tree › audit-main › x › uexecutor
push-chain-evm
- https: › › github.com › pushchain › push-chain-evm ›

Appendix 3. Additional Valuables

Frameworks and Methodologies

This security assessment was conducted in alignment with recognised penetration testing standards, methodologies and guidelines, including the NIST SP 800-115 – Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment , and the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) , These assets provide a structured foundation for planning, executing, and documenting technical evaluations such as vulnerability assessments, exploitation activities, and security code reviews. Hacken’s internal penetration testing methodology extends these principles to Web2 and Web3 environments to ensure consistency, repeatability, and verifiable outcomes.

Disclaimer