Audit name:
[SCA] FortisX | FortisX Token | Sep2026
Date:
Sep 15, 2026
Table of Content
Introduction
We express our gratitude to the FortisX team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.
Fortisx is a fixed-supply ERC-20 token contract for EVM-compatible chains. The core mechanism is a one-time constructor mint of the full token supply to a designated recipient, after which holders may transfer and burn tokens under the ERC-20 and burnable standards.
Document | |
|---|---|
| Name | Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for FortisX |
| Audited By | Kornel Światłowski |
| Approved By | Khrystyna Tkachuk |
| Website | https://fortisx.fi/→ |
| Changelog | 04/09/2026 - Preliminary Report |
| 15/09/2026 - Final Report | |
| Platform | BNB Smart Chain |
| Language | Solidity |
| Tags | ERC-20 |
| Methodology | https://docs.hacken.io/methodologies/smart-contracts→ |
Document
- Name
- Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for FortisX
- Audited By
- Kornel Światłowski
- Approved By
- Khrystyna Tkachuk
- Website
- https://fortisx.fi/→
- Changelog
- 04/09/2026 - Preliminary Report
- 15/09/2026 - Final Report
- Platform
- BNB Smart Chain
- Language
- Solidity
- Tags
- ERC-20
Review Scope | |
|---|---|
| Deployed at | https://bscscan.com/token/0x15c6aff6d6ec800e11da07f03b8e37df1bd570f4→ |
Review Scope
Audit Summary
The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report
Documentation quality
Functional requirements are not provided.
Technical description is absent.
No README, whitepaper/spec, or deployment documentation in-repo
No NatSpec covering supply, one-shot mint, burnable
totalSupply, orrecipienttrust
Code quality
The development environment is not configured.
Code uses OpenZeppelin standards.
Test coverage
Code coverage of the project is 0% (branch coverage).
No project-owned test suite was provided.
System Overview
The in-scope deployment consists of a single concrete contract, Fortisx, which inherits OpenZeppelin Contracts v5.4.0 ERC20 and ERC20Burnable. No proxy, upgradeability, or multi-contract orchestration is used. Token identity is fixed at construction as name Fortisx and symbol FRSX, with the standard ERC-20 decimal precision inherited from ERC20.
At deployment, the constructor receives a recipient address and mints 100_000_000 * 10 ** decimals() tokens to that address via _mint. No further mint path is exposed. Post-deployment token lifecycle is limited to standard ERC-20 transfers and allowances, plus burn operations inherited from ERC20Burnable (burn and burnFrom), which permanently reduce circulating supply. External dependency is confined to the OpenZeppelin ERC-20 token and burnable extension libraries.
Files in Scope
Fortisx.sol — Defines the Fortisx ERC-20 token. The constructor mints the entire fixed supply to a provided
recipient; thereafter, token holders interact through inherited ERC-20 transfer/allowance functions and ERC20Burnable burn functions.
Privileged roles
No privileged roles are defined. The constructor mints the fixed supply to a recipient address with no ongoing access control.
Potential Risks
Single Points of Failure and Control: The entire Fortisx (FRSX) token supply is concentrated in a single address at deployment, creating a sole point of economic control over the circulating float. The Fortisx constructor invokes _mint to credit 100_000_000 * 10 ** decimals() tokens exclusively to the constructor recipient parameter. However, the project has confirmed that the initial token supply will be held by a multisignature (multisig) wallet, reducing the risk of unilateral control over the tokens. No on-chain vesting or distribution split is enforced by the contract. While compromise of the multisig or coordinated action by its authorized signers could still result in the transfer or, via inherited ERC20Burnable paths such as burn and burnFrom, permanent destruction of the full supply, the use of a multisig provides an additional layer of protection against a single-key compromise or unilateral action.
Findings
Code ― | Title | Status | Severity | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| F-2026-1920 | Floating Pragma | accepted | Observation |
Appendix 1. Definitions
Severities
When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.
Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:
Severity | Description |
|---|---|
Critical | Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
High | High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
Medium | Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category. |
Low | Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution. |
Severity
- Critical
Description
- Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- High
Description
- High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- Medium
Description
- Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.
Severity
- Low
Description
- Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
Potential Risks
The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.
Appendix 2. Scope
The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:
Scope Details | |
|---|---|
| Deployed at | https://bscscan.com/token/0x15c6aff6d6ec800e11da07f03b8e37df1bd570f4→ |
| Whitepaper | - |
| Requirements | - |
| Technical Requirements | - |
Scope Details
- Whitepaper
- -
- Requirements
- -
- Technical Requirements
- -
Assets in Scope
Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Additional Recommendations
The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.
To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:
Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.
Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.
Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.
These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.
Frameworks and Methodologies
This security assessment was conducted in alignment with recognised penetration testing standards, methodologies and guidelines, including the NIST SP 800-115 – Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment →, and the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) →, These assets provide a structured foundation for planning, executing, and documenting technical evaluations such as vulnerability assessments, exploitation activities, and security code reviews. Hacken’s internal penetration testing methodology extends these principles to Web2 and Web3 environments to ensure consistency, repeatability, and verifiable outcomes.