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Audit name:

[SCA] Europeum | DIDR | Jul2026

Date:

Aug 11, 2026

Table of Content

Introduction
Audit Summary
System Overview
Potential Risks
Findings
Appendix 1. Definitions
Appendix 2. Scope
Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Disclaimer

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Introduction

We express our gratitude to the Europeum team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.

The project implements an EVM-based Decentralized Identifier (DID) registry that conforms to the W3C DID Data Model, allowing users to register on-chain DID documents and manage their controllers, verification methods, and verification relationships. Access to mutating operations is gated by DID controllership or, alternatively, by policies resolved through an external policy registry contract.

Document

NameSmart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Europeum
Audited ByKhrystyna Tkachuk
Approved ByKerem Solmaz
Websitehttps://europeum.eu/
Changelog28/07/2026 - Preliminary Report
10/08/2026 - Final Report
12/08/2026 - Updated Final Report
PlatformPrivate Chain
LanguageSolidity
TagsUpgradable, Decentralized Identity (DID)
Methodologyhttps://docs.hacken.io/methodologies/smart-contracts
  • Document

    Name
    Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Europeum
    Audited By
    Khrystyna Tkachuk
    Approved By
    Kerem Solmaz
    Changelog
    28/07/2026 - Preliminary Report
    10/08/2026 - Final Report
    12/08/2026 - Updated Final Report
    Platform
    Private Chain
    Language
    Solidity
    Tags
    Upgradable, Decentralized Identity (DID)

Review Scope

Repositoryhttps://gitlab.com/europeum/public/core-services/
Commit89bb63b
Final Commit7f13e31
Updated Final Commitd1535ba

Audit Summary

13Total Findings
12Resolved
1Accepted
0Mitigated

The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report

Documentation quality

  • Functional requirements is partially missed.

    • Project overview is suficient.

    • All roles in the system are not described..

    • Use cases are  not described.

  • Technical description is provided.

    • Run instructions are provided.

    • Technical specification is provided.

    • NatSpec is insufficient and partially missing for core functions.

    • Inline comments are present

Code quality

  • The code leverages OpenZeppelin 5.6.1 (Initializable) and shared in-house primitives (Pagination, ImplementationInitSelector), and follows the established beacon-proxy upgradeable pattern with a reserved storage gap.

  • The codebase is well-structured and clearly organized, with a clean split between the entry contract, interfaces, and storage-struct libraries.

  • The development environment is configured.

Test coverage

Code coverage of the project is 91.78% (statement coverage).

  • Deployment and basic user interactions are covered with 38 passing tests.

  • The test  suite exercises the protocol's core end-to-end features covering both success and revert paths for document insertion, controller add/revoke with the 10-controller cap, verification method add/revoke/expire/roll, relationships, pagination, and policy-based authorization via a mocked policy registry.

System Overview

The system is built around a single upgradeable facade contract, DidRegistry, which is intended to be deployed behind a beacon proxy. Upgrade safety is provided through OpenZeppelin's Initializable pattern, with the constructor disabling initializers via _disableInitializers, an initialize function performing one-time setup, a storage __gap reserved for future variables, and the ImplementationInitSelector mechanism exposing the initializer selector through getImplementationInitSelector. The contract holds three internal storage structures (DidDocuments, Controllers, and VRelationships) whose types are declared in the interface files, and business logic is delegated to three external libraries bound to these structures through using ... for directives. This library-based composition keeps the facade thin while isolating document, controller, and relationship logic into dedicated modules.

State-changing operations follow a consistent pattern in which DidRegistry performs authorization, delegates to the relevant library, and emits an event. Authorization is enforced by the internal onlyControllerOrAuth routine, which first checks whether msg.sender maps to an active capabilityInvocation verification method of one of the DID's controllers, and otherwise queries the external IPolicyRegistry contract via checkPolicy to determine whether the caller is authorized for a named policy attribute. This creates a cross-contract dependency between the registry and an externally deployed policy registry supplied at initialization. Read operations expose paginated views of DIDs, DIDs by controller, and DIDs by verification relationship using the external Pagination utility, and support point-in-time document resolution by filtering verification methods and relationships against a supplied timestamp.

The subsystems are organized by concern. The document subsystem, driven by DidDocumentLib, manages the lifecycle of DID documents, verification methods, and verification relationships, including insertion, updates, key rolling, revocation, and expiry, and derives EVM addresses from secp256k1 public keys. The controller subsystem, driven by ControllersLib, maintains reverse indexes linking controllers to the DIDs they control. The verification relationship subsystem, driven by VRelationshipsLib, maintains time-bounded relationship records indexed by a hash of relationship name and verification method identifier. Supported relationship types follow the W3C DID vocabulary, namely authentication, assertionMethod, keyAgreement, capabilityInvocation, and capabilityDelegation. String comparison across all modules is centralized in UtilsLib.

Files in Scope

  • DidRegistry.sol: Upgradeable facade contract that stores DID document, controller, and verification relationship state, and exposes external functions such as insertDidDocument, updateBaseDocument, addController, revokeController, addVerificationMethod, addVerificationRelationship, revokeVerificationMethod, expireVerificationMethod, and rollVerificationMethod. It enforces authorization through onlyControllerOrAuth and _checkController, provides paginated and timestamp-based read views, and integrates with an external policy registry.

  • DidDocumentLib.sol: Core library operating on the DidDocuments storage structure that handles DID document creation and mutation, including insertDidDocument, updateBaseDocument, addController, revokeController, addVerificationMethod, addVerificationRelationship, revokeVerificationMethod, expireVerificationMethod, and rollVerificationMethod. It also builds timestamp-filtered document views via getDidDocumentByTimestamp, validates relationship names via isValidRelationshipName, and derives addresses from public keys through getAddress and sanitizePublicKey. It defines the MAX_CONTROLLERS constant of 10.

  • ControllersLib.sol: Library that maintains the controller-to-DID reverse index, providing linkDidToController to append a DID under a controller and unlinkDidFromController to remove it using swap-and-pop with index remapping.

  • VRelationshipsLib.sol: Library that manages time-bounded verification relationship records keyed by a relationship identifier, exposing addVerificationRelationship to append a DID with its validity period and updateVerificationRelationship to adjust the notAfter timestamp of an existing entry.

  • UtilsLib.sol: Utility library providing the equalStrings helper, which compares two strings by length and keccak256 hash for use across the other modules.

Privileged roles

DidRegistry.sol

  • DID Controller: An address that holds an active capabilityInvocation verification method belonging to the target DID or any of its linked controller DIDs, validated through _checkController inside the onlyControllerOrAuth gate. Authorized to modify a DID document it controls.

    • Can call updateBaseDocument to replace the base document of the DID.

    • Can call addController to link an additional controller DID.

    • Can call revokeController to unlink a controller DID.

    • Can call addVerificationMethod to register a new verification method.

    • Can call addVerificationRelationship to register a new verification relationship.

    • Can call revokeVerificationMethod to revoke a verification method with a past notAfter.

    • Can call expireVerificationMethod to set a future notAfter expiry on a verification method.

    • Can call rollVerificationMethod to rotate a verification method to a new key while migrating its relationships.

  • Policy-Authorized Caller: An address that is not a DID controller but is approved by policyRegistryContract via checkPolicy for the specific tprAttribute string of the invoked function, evaluated in the onlyControllerOrAuth gate. Granted the same document-modification powers as the DID Controller.

    • Can call updateBaseDocument when authorized for policy DID:updateBaseDocument.

    • Can call addController when authorized for policy DID:addController.

    • Can call revokeController when authorized for policy DID:revokeController.

    • Can call addVerificationMethod when authorized for policy DID:addVerificationMethod.

    • Can call addVerificationRelationship when authorized for policy DID:addVerificationRelationship.

    • Can call revokeVerificationMethod when authorized for policy DID:revokeVerificationMethod.

    • Can call expireVerificationMethod when authorized for policy DID:expireVerificationMethod.

    • Can call rollVerificationMethod when authorized for policy DID:rollVerificationMethod.

Note: insertDidDocument is permissionless (any caller may register a new DID, provided the first verification method is flagged as secp256k1).

Potential Risks

Partial Audit Scope: The audit scope is a strict subset of the repository's deployable code. Only DidRegistry, DidDocumentLib, ControllersLib, VRelationshipsLib, and UtilsLib are in scope, while the beacon proxy contracts imported through @ebsiint-sc/beacon-proxy (referenced by the out-of-scope BeaconImports.sol helper), the Pagination and ImplementationInitSelector utilities from @ebsiint-sc/bootstrap, and the IPolicyRegistry implementation are excluded. Vulnerabilities in these out-of-scope components that the in-scope contracts depend upon may compromise the overall security posture despite the audited code being correct.

Dependency on External Authorization Logic: The single authorization gate onlyControllerOrAuth in DidRegistry delegates its fallback decision to an external contract by calling checkPolicy on the resolved IPolicyRegistry, where policyRegistryContract is set once during initialize. Every mutating entry point (updateBaseDocument, addController, revokeController, addVerificationMethod, addVerificationRelationship, revokeVerificationMethod, expireVerificationMethod, rollVerificationMethod) trusts the boolean returned by this out-of-scope contract without additional validation. A compromised, misconfigured, or upgraded policy registry that returns true incorrectly would grant unauthorized mutation rights over any DID.

Unbounded Iteration Over Verification Relationships: Per-DID vRelationships and capabilityInvocations arrays grow without an upper bound comparable to MAX_CONTROLLERS, and revoke, expire, and roll never prune entries—they only shorten notAfter or append. getDidDocumentByTimestamp in DidDocumentLib allocates scratch storage sized to the sum of those arrays and de-duplicates methods with a nested string comparison loop, so a DID that accumulates enough history can permanently exceed the block gas limit on whole-document resolution. Roll and revoke are not affected by this growth: they iterate only the per-method vRelationshipsIndexes list, which is bounded to at most four non-CI relationship names, and control resolution via _checkController remains O(1) over the capped controllers list.

Forced Mutation of DIDs Without Controller Consent: The onlyControllerOrAuth check treats a positive checkPolicy result as fully equivalent to being a DID controller, so any address holding the relevant policy attribute in the policy registry can execute state-changing operations on any DID without the subject's approval. Such an authorized party can call addController, revokeController, rollVerificationMethod, revokeVerificationMethod, or updateBaseDocument on a DID it does not control. This permits reassigning control, revoking legitimate keys, or rewriting the base document of a third party's identity entirely outside the DID owner's consent.

Absence of Timelock and Pause Controls: The eight controller-or-policy-gated mutating operations in DidRegistry execute immediately, and no pause, delay, or reversal mechanism exists anywhere in the in-scope contracts. Sensitive actions such as revokeController and rollVerificationMethod take effect within the same transaction they are submitted in. In the event of a key compromise or an erroneously granted policy attribute, there is no buffer window to detect or revert a malicious controller reassignment or verification-method roll before it becomes final.

Single Point of Failure in the Policy Authority: Authorization for all privileged mutations funnels through the external policy registry, and the entity controlling policy assignments can grant itself or others the attributes checked in onlyControllerOrAuth. This makes the policy registry a concentrated point of control able to override the per-DID controller model across the entire registry. Compromise of the policy-granting authority would enable takeover of arbitrary DIDs regardless of their on-chain controllers.

Upgradeable Proxy Logic Replacement: The contract uses the OpenZeppelin Initializable pattern with a disabled constructor via _disableInitializers and an initialize initializer, and is intended to run behind a beacon proxy, allowing its logic to be swapped after deployment. A faulty or malicious upgrade could alter authorization semantics, DID resolution, or key-rotation behavior without redeploying the storage. Because upgrades take effect immediately through the beacon with no in-contract review window, a defective implementation would be live as soon as it is pushed.

Permissionless Registration and Identifier Squatting: insertDidDocument in DidRegistry carries no access-control check, so any caller can register any unused did string, becoming its self-controller through the document's controller push and linkDidToController. There is no on-chain proof binding the arbitrary did string to the registrant's real identity, and registration succeeds for the first party to submit an unused identifier. An attacker can front-run or pre-register identifiers belonging to legitimate off-chain subjects, seizing control of those DIDs and impersonating the intended owner.

Unvalidated Base Document Content: The baseDocument is stored and updated as an opaque string with only a non-empty length check in insertDidDocument and updateBaseDocument, and its contents are never parsed or validated against the on-chain verification methods and relationships. A controller or policy-authorized party can set the base document to arbitrary or inconsistent JSON. Off-chain resolvers that trust this field may consume malformed or contradictory DID document data that diverges from the on-chain key material.

Address Rebinding During Verification Method Roll: When rolling a capability-invocation method, rollVerificationMethod in DidDocumentLib clears the old secp256k1 entry in vMethodIdOfAddress and binds the replacement key's derived address, while migrating relationship and capability-invocation bookkeeping. The CI branch now requires isSecp256k1 and always writes the new binding, so a non-secp replacement can no longer clear control without installing a successor. Address derivation still depends on getAddress / sanitizePublicKey, which only enforce 64- or 65-byte key length (and the 0x04 prefix) and do not validate a secp256k1 curve point. A length-valid but incorrect key therefore still hashes to some address and can be bound during a roll; if no party controls that address, _checkController stops resolving key-based control and recovery requires policy-based intervention.

Findings

Code
Title
Status
Severity
F-2026-1870Missing Revoked Guard in addVerificationRelationship Grants a Revoked Key Non-Revocable Control
fixed

Medium
F-2026-1869Scheduling a Future Expiry Revokes Control Immediately Instead of at the Scheduled Time
fixed

Medium
F-2026-1825Rolling a Capability Invocation Key to a Non-secp256k1 Key Strands Identifier Control
fixed

Medium
F-2026-1869Trusted Policy Registry Authorization Applies Globally Instead of Per DID
accepted

Low
F-2026-1869Permissionless Registration Accepts a Never-Valid Control Window Enabling Squatting and Permanent Lockout
fixed

Low
F-2026-1869expireVerificationMethod Accepts a Later Expiry and Can Extend Validity Instead of Shortening It
fixed

Low
F-2026-1846revokeController Allows Removing the Last Controller and Locking Out the DID
fixed

Low
F-2026-1889Missing Secp256k1 Enforcement in addVerificationRelationship CapabilityInvocation Path Strands DID Control
fixed

Low
F-2026-1870Strict Control Bounds Versus Inclusive Read-View Bounds Create a Boundary Asymmetry
fixed

Observation
F-2026-1870rollVerificationMethod Sets the Relationship-Uniqueness Tuple Without the Add-Path Guard
fixed

Observation
1-10 of 13 findings

Identify vulnerabilities in your smart contracts.

Appendix 1. Definitions

Severities

When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.

Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:

Severity

Description

Critical
Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

High
High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

Medium
Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

Low
Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
  • Severity

    Critical

    Description

    Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    High

    Description

    High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    Medium

    Description

    Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

    Severity

    Low

    Description

    Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.

Potential Risks

The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.

Appendix 2. Scope

The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:

Scope Details

Repositoryhttps://gitlab.com/europeum/public/core-services/
Commit89bb63b74e88c7e3b1602f4801d682e634b6a521
Final Commit7f13e31046833e9cfcd90fa5836b3e02b83bb124
Updated Final Commitd1535bacb0ee03fc987339c58324b34c3db14687
WhitepaperN/A
RequirementsREADME.md; NatSpec
Technical RequirementsREADME.md; NatSpec
  • Scope Details

    Commit
    89bb63b74e88c7e3b1602f4801d682e634b6a521
    Final Commit
    7f13e31046833e9cfcd90fa5836b3e02b83bb124
    Updated Final Commit
    d1535bacb0ee03fc987339c58324b34c3db14687
    Whitepaper
    N/A
    Requirements
    README.md; NatSpec
    Technical Requirements
    README.md; NatSpec

Assets in Scope

contracts
did-registry
contracts
DidRegistry.sol - contracts › did-registry › contracts › DidRegistry.sol
library
ControllersLib.sol - contracts › did-registry › contracts › library › ControllersLib.sol
DidDocumentLib.sol - contracts › did-registry › contracts › library › DidDocumentLib.sol
VRelationshipsLib.sol - contracts › did-registry › contracts › library › VRelationshipsLib.sol
UtilsLib.sol - contracts › did-registry › contracts › UtilsLib.sol

Appendix 3. Additional Valuables

Additional Recommendations

The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.

To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:

  • Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.

  • Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.

  • Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.

These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.

Frameworks and Methodologies

This security assessment was conducted in alignment with recognised penetration testing standards, methodologies and guidelines, including the NIST SP 800-115 – Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment , and the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) , These assets provide a structured foundation for planning, executing, and documenting technical evaluations such as vulnerability assessments, exploitation activities, and security code reviews. Hacken’s internal penetration testing methodology extends these principles to Web2 and Web3 environments to ensure consistency, repeatability, and verifiable outcomes.

Disclaimer