Q2 2026 Security & Compliance Report67 incidents, $764M in losses, 88% from operational failures.
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Audit name:

[SCA] Europeum | Bootstrap | Jul2026

Date:

Aug 12, 2026

Table of Content

→Introduction
→Audit Summary
→System Overview
→Potential Risks
→Findings
→Appendix 1. Definitions
→Appendix 2. Scope
→Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
→Disclaimer

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Introduction

We express our gratitude to the Europeum team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.

Europeum operates and scales Europe’s sovereign digital trust infrastructure, enabling secure, transparent, and interoperable services across the public and private sectors. The Bootstrap package provides shared Solidity utilities used by other Europeum smart contracts.

Document

NameSmart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report of Bootstrap for Europeum
Audited BySeher Saylik
Approved ByKerem Solmaz
Websitehttps://europeum.eu/→
Changelog30/07/2026 - Preliminary Report
31/08/2026 - Second Report
21/09/2026 - Updated Final Report
PlatformPrivate Chain
LanguageSolidity
TagsProxy, Upgradable
Methodologyhttps://docs.hacken.io/methodologies/smart-contracts→
  • Document

    Name
    Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report of Bootstrap for Europeum
    Audited By
    Seher Saylik
    Approved By
    Kerem Solmaz
    Changelog
    30/07/2026 - Preliminary Report
    31/08/2026 - Second Report
    21/09/2026 - Updated Final Report
    Platform
    Private Chain
    Language
    Solidity
    Tags
    Proxy, Upgradable

Review Scope

Repositoryhttps://gitlab.com/europeum/public/core/-/tree/main/contracts/bootstrap→
Commit89bb63b
Retestd1535ba
Updated Final Commitf8a252b
StringManip address0xF2858bee9Aa207187C0f9c30CF3b0F74431ac050→

Audit Summary

2Total Findings
1Resolved
1Accepted
0Mitigated

The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report

Documentation quality

  • Functional requirements are partially documented through inline comments and NatSpec.

  • Technical description is  provided.

Code quality

  • The code is generally simple and reuses OpenZeppelin components. However, identical Pagination implementations are duplicated across several packages, and StringManip is only a thin wrapper around OpenZeppelin’s Strings.toHexString().

  • The development environment is configured.

Test coverage

Code coverage of the project is 0% (branch coverage) as no tests were provided.

System Overview

Europeum Core Services Bootstrap provides shared utility contracts and libraries used by other contracts in the system:

ImplementationInitSelector — an abstract ERC-165 contract that allows upgradeable implementations to report the selector of their initialization function. ProxyFactory uses this information when preparing initialization data for new beacon proxies.

Pagination — a library that calculates pagination parameters and returns selected items from string[], bytes32[], uint256, bytes[], and address[] collections.

StringManip — a library that converts an Ethereum address into its hexadecimal string representation. It is used by the Timestamp system to represent account addresses as owner identifiers.

Privileged Roles

The contracts in scope do not define privileged roles or access-control functions.

Potential Risks

Because callers do not limit page, a very large out-of-range value can overflow the cursor calculation and make the affected pagination getter revert with panic 0x11 instead of returning an empty page.

Because Pagination does not enforce upper bounds on pageSize, a caller that forgets to cap this value may allocate a very large memory array and cause the call to fail with an opaque out-of-memory panic.

Findings

F-2026-1872Pagination Helper Returns prev and next in Reversed Order
Status
fixed
Severity

Observation
F-2026-1911[DualDefense] - ERC-165 Mixin Shadows IAccessControl Interface Support
Status
accepted
Severity

Observation
Code
―
Title
Status
Severity
F-2026-1872Pagination Helper Returns prev and next in Reversed Order
fixed

Observation
F-2026-1911[DualDefense] - ERC-165 Mixin Shadows IAccessControl Interface Support
accepted

Observation
1-2 of 2 findings

Identify vulnerabilities in your smart contracts.

Appendix 1. Definitions

Severities

When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.

Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:

Severity

Description

Critical
Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

High
High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

Medium
Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

Low
Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
  • Severity

    Critical

    Description

    Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    High

    Description

    High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    Medium

    Description

    Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

    Severity

    Low

    Description

    Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.

Potential Risks

The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.

Appendix 2. Scope

The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:

Scope Details

Repositoryhttps://gitlab.com/europeum/public/core/-/tree/main/contracts/bootstrap→
Commit89bb63b74e88c7e3b1602f4801d682e634b6a521
Second Commitd1535bacb0ee03fc987339c58324b34c3db14687
Updated Final Commitf8a252b4695954d2e5dff6ce3b868a289e9c6645
WhitepaperN/A
RequirementsNatSpec
Technical RequirementsN/A

Assets in Scope

contracts
bootstrap
contracts
utils
Pagination.sol - contracts › bootstrap › contracts › utils › Pagination.sol
roles
Roles.sol - contracts › bootstrap › contracts › utils › roles › Roles.sol
StringManip.sol - contracts › bootstrap › contracts › utils › StringManip.sol
introspection
ImplementationInitSelector.sol - contracts › bootstrap › contracts › utils › introspection › ImplementationInitSelector.sol

Appendix 3. Additional Valuables

Additional Recommendations

The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.

To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:

  • Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.

  • Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.

  • Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.

These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.

Frameworks and Methodologies

This security assessment was conducted in alignment with recognised penetration testing standards, methodologies and guidelines, including the NIST SP 800-115 – Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment →, and the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) →, These assets provide a structured foundation for planning, executing, and documenting technical evaluations such as vulnerability assessments, exploitation activities, and security code reviews. Hacken’s internal penetration testing methodology extends these principles to Web2 and Web3 environments to ensure consistency, repeatability, and verifiable outcomes.

Disclaimer