Introduction
We express our gratitude to the eStorm team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.
E-STORM plugin-algebra is a plugin system built on top of the Algebra Integral DEX protocol that introduces fungible ERC-20 LP tokens as representations of concentrated liquidity positions.
Document | |
|---|---|
| Name | Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for eStorm |
| Audited By | Olesia Bilenka; Ivan Bondar |
| Approved By | Ivan Bondar |
| Website | N/A |
| Changelog | 23/02/2026 - Preliminary Report |
| 10/03/2026 - Remediation Report | |
| 02/06/2026 - Final Report | |
| Platform | N/A |
| Language | Solidity |
| Tags | Factory; Token Standards used (ERC20, ERC721, etc); Automated Market Maker (AMM); Liquidity Pool |
| Methodology | https://docs.hacken.io/methodologies/smart-contracts→ |
Document
- Name
- Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for eStorm
- Audited By
- Olesia Bilenka; Ivan Bondar
- Approved By
- Ivan Bondar
- Website
- N/A
- Changelog
- 23/02/2026 - Preliminary Report
- 10/03/2026 - Remediation Report
- 02/06/2026 - Final Report
- Platform
- N/A
- Language
- Solidity
- Tags
- Factory; Token Standards used (ERC20, ERC721, etc); Automated Market Maker (AMM); Liquidity Pool
Review Scope | |
|---|---|
| Repository | https://github.com/OrganizationE-STORM/plugin-algebra-hacken-auditor→ |
| Commit | 7bc5d54 |
| Remediation Commit | 8c50ecf |
| Final Commit | c2b3f9e |
Review Scope
- Commit
- 7bc5d54
- Remediation Commit
- 8c50ecf
- Final Commit
- c2b3f9e
Audit Summary
The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report
Documentation quality
Functional requirements are partially missed.
Technical description is not provided.
Code quality
The development environment is configured.
Test coverage
Code coverage of the project is 93% (branch coverage).
Deployment and basic user interactions are covered with tests.
The current tests cover the majority of scenarios, with a small number of edge cases remaining.
Interactions by several users are tested thoroughly.
System Overview
E-STORM plugin-algebra is a plugin system built on top of the Algebra Integral DEX protocol that introduces fungible ERC-20 LP tokens as representations of concentrated liquidity positions. Instead of requiring users to hold non-fungible position NFTs (as is standard in concentrated liquidity DEXs), the plugin allows multiple users to pool liquidity into shared tick ranges and receive proportional, fungible LP tokens in return.
When a user deposits liquidity into a specific tick range (either directly via the callback contract or by transferring an existing Algebra NFT position), the plugin mints LP tokens proportional to the value contributed relative to the existing position. LP token amounts for the first depositor in a given tick range are set to a fixed initial amount; subsequent depositors receive tokens proportional to the ratio of their deposit value to the pre-existing position value, both denominated in token1 terms using the current pool price. Withdrawals burn LP tokens and return a proportional share of the underlying liquidity plus accrued fees.
The plugin also intercepts swaps on the associated Algebra pool to apply a configurable plugin fee (expressed in parts per million) on top of the pool's base swap fee. Collected plugin fees accumulate in the plugin contract and can be withdrawn by the factory owner.
The system is deployed through a factory pattern: the LPPluginFactory owner creates custom Algebra pools and deploys LPPlugin instances bound to those pools. Each plugin deploys its own LPCallback helper for minting positions and creates LPToken ERC-20 contracts on demand via the LPTokenFactory for each unique tick range.
Files in scope
LPPlugin.sol - Core plugin contract that hooks into Algebra pool lifecycle events (position modifications, swaps). Manages the mapping of tick ranges to fungible LP tokens, handles LP token minting/burning proportional to deposited value, processes NFT-to-LP-token conversions via
onERC721Received, computes position values, and applies a configurable plugin fee on swaps.LPPluginFactory.sol - Ownable factory contract that deploys LPPlugin instances, creates custom Algebra pools via the entry point, and provides owner-gated administrative functions to configure pool parameters (tick spacing, plugin address, plugin config, fees) and manage plugin fee collection and rates.
LPCallback.sol - Helper contract deployed per-plugin that executes mint calls on the Algebra pool on behalf of the plugin. Implements the algebraMintCallback to transfer tokens from the payer to the pool, supporting native token wrapping and transferFrom-based payments.
LPToken.sol - Standard ERC-20 token with owner-restricted mint and burn functions. Each instance represents shares of a specific tick-range liquidity position. Ownership is transferred to the calling LPPlugin upon creation.
LPTokenFactory.sol - Stateless factory that deploys new LPToken instances and transfers their ownership to the caller (LPPlugin).
CallbackStructs.sol - Library defining the
MintCallbackDatastruct used to pass pool key and payer information through Algebra's mint callback mechanism.ILPCallback.sol - Interface for the LPCallback contract, extending IAlgebraMintCallback with a mint function signature.
ILPPluginFactory.sol - Interface for the LPPluginFactory, exposing deploy, WNativeToken, and lpTokenFactory accessors.
ILPToken.sol - Interface for LPToken, extending IERC20 with
mint,burn, andtransferOwnershipfunctions.ILPTokenFactory.sol - Interface for LPTokenFactory, exposing the create function.
Privileged roles
LPPluginFactory.sol:
owner (OpenZeppelin Ownable): Has full administrative control over the system. Can:
Deploy new LPPlugin instances via
deploy.Create custom Algebra pools via the inherited
createCustomPool.Set tick spacing on any managed pool via
setTickSpacing.Replace the plugin address on any managed pool via
setPlugin.Reconfigure plugin hook flags on any managed pool via
setPluginConfig.Set the base swap fee on any managed pool via
setFee.Collect accumulated plugin fees from any plugin via
collectFee.Update the plugin fee rate on any plugin via
setPluginFeeRate.Transfer ownership or renounce ownership (inherited from Ownable).
LPPlugin.sol:
pluginFactory (acts as the authorized caller via
_authorize): The only address permitted to:Set the plugin fee rate via
setPluginFeeRate.Collect plugin fees via
collectPluginFee(inherited from AbstractPlugin).
pool (the associated Algebra pool, enforced via
onlyPoolmodifier):The only address permitted to invoke plugin hook functions:
beforeInitialize,beforeModifyPosition,afterModifyPosition,beforeSwap, andhandlePluginFee.
LPToken.sol:
owner (OpenZeppelin Ownable, transferred to the LPPlugin upon creation): The only address permitted to:
Mint new LP tokens via
mint.Burn LP tokens from any holder via
burn.Transfer ownership or renounce ownership (inherited from Ownable).
Potential Risks
Dependency on Algebra Integral Protocol Infrastructure: The system operates as a plugin within the Algebra Integral DEX ecosystem. Core functionality, including pool creation, liquidity management, swap execution, fee accrual, and position accounting, is delegated to external Algebra contracts (AlgebraPool, AlgebraFactory, AlgebraCustomPoolEntryPoint, NonfungiblePositionManager). Any vulnerability, upgrade, or behavioral change in these external contracts directly affects the security and correctness of the plugin system, including LP token valuation, fee distribution, and withdrawal mechanics.
Concentrated Liquidity Price-Dependent Valuation Risk: LP token minting and withdrawal calculations depend on the instantaneous pool price to convert between token0 and token1 denominations. In concentrated liquidity pools, position value is highly sensitive to price movements within and outside the specified tick range. Significant price volatility may cause LP token valuations to diverge from the underlying position's realized value, and positions that move entirely out of range may become single-sided, affecting withdrawal ratios.
Incompatibility with Fee-on-Transfer and Rebasing Tokens: The plugin system relies on nominal transfer amounts for token accounting. Approvals, callback payments, and LP token minting calculations use return values and specified amounts rather than balance deltas. Tokens that charge a fee on transfer or that rebase (adjust balances automatically) are incompatible with this architecture and may result in accounting mismatches, failed transactions, or loss of funds if used as pool tokens.
Centralized Administrative Control over Plugin Parameters: The LPPluginFactory owner holds unilateral authority over critical operational parameters: plugin fee rates, pool fee configuration, tick spacing, plugin replacement, and plugin fee collection. Compromise or misuse of the owner key may result in extraction of accumulated plugin fees, modification of fee rates to unfavorable levels, or replacement of the active plugin on a pool, directly impacting all LP token holders.
LP Token Ownership Concentration: Each LPToken contract is owned exclusively by the LPPlugin that created it. The plugin is the sole entity authorized to mint and burn LP tokens. If the plugin becomes non-functional (e.g., due to a pool-level configuration change that disconnects the plugin), LP token holders may lose the ability to withdraw their underlying liquidity through the standard withdrawal path.
Dependence on External NFT Position Manager Trust Model: The onERC721Received flow delegates position management operations (positions, decreaseLiquidity, collect) to msg.sender, which is expected to be a legitimate NonfungiblePositionManager.
Findings
Code ― | Title | Status | Severity | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| F-2026-1513 | Incorrect Token0-to-Token1 Conversion in convertToken0ToToken1 Leads to Mispriced LP Token Shares | fixed | Critical | |
| F-2026-1512 | Accumulated Fees Lost During NFT Migration | fixed | Critical | |
| F-2026-1513 | Unvalidated msg.sender in onERC721Received Allows Theft of Accumulated Plugin Token Balances | fixed | Critical | |
| F-2026-1512 | Tokens Lost When Migrating Out-of-Range NFT Positions | fixed | Critical | |
| F-2026-1514 | First-Depositor Inflation Attack via positionValue Rounding to Zero Leads to Theft of Subsequent Depositors' Funds | fixed | High | |
| F-2026-1517 | Missing getCurrentFee() implementation and incompatible setFee() in LPPluginFactory | fixed | Medium | |
| F-2026-1698 | [DualDefense] Missing Refund of Unconsumed Tokens in deposit Function | fixed | Medium | |
| F-2026-1521 | Documentation-Implementation Mismatch: Permissionless Plugin Deployment | fixed | Low | |
| F-2026-1520 | Absence of Minimum LP Token Output Protection in Deposit Flow Exposes Users to Sandwich-Induced LP Token Dilution | fixed | Low | |
| F-2026-1513 | deploy Function Requires Undocumented Role Configuration and Multiple Transactions | fixed | Low |
Appendix 1. Definitions
Severities
When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.
Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:
Severity | Description |
|---|---|
Critical | Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
High | High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
Medium | Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category. |
Low | Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution. |
Severity
- Critical
Description
- Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- High
Description
- High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- Medium
Description
- Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.
Severity
- Low
Description
- Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
Potential Risks
The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.
Appendix 2. Scope
The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:
Scope Details | |
|---|---|
| Repository | https://github.com/OrganizationE-STORM/plugin-algebra-hacken-auditor→ |
| Commit | 7bc5d547e196e1a43f9b609826fb081d6b38e1d5 |
| Remediation Commit | 8c50ecf3657753e4de33d95851f9b2566103b4f0 |
| Final Commit | c2b3f9e2e78bb9eb19030e3e776ebfa81c9128cd |
| Whitepaper | N/A |
| Requirements | NatSpec |
| Technical Requirements | README.md |
Scope Details
- Commit
- 7bc5d547e196e1a43f9b609826fb081d6b38e1d5
- Remediation Commit
- 8c50ecf3657753e4de33d95851f9b2566103b4f0
- Final Commit
- c2b3f9e2e78bb9eb19030e3e776ebfa81c9128cd
- Whitepaper
- N/A
- Requirements
- NatSpec
- Technical Requirements
- README.md
Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Additional Recommendations
The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.
To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:
Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.
Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.
Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.
These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.
Frameworks and Methodologies
This security assessment was conducted in alignment with recognised penetration testing standards, methodologies and guidelines, including the NIST SP 800-115 – Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment →, and the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) →, These assets provide a structured foundation for planning, executing, and documenting technical evaluations such as vulnerability assessments, exploitation activities, and security code reviews. Hacken’s internal penetration testing methodology extends these principles to Web2 and Web3 environments to ensure consistency, repeatability, and verifiable outcomes.