Q1 2026 Security & Compliance Report44 incidents, $482M in losses, insights from 11 industry leaders.
Read the report

Audit name:

[SCA] EStorm | Token | Jan2026 retest

Date:

Mar 10, 2026

Table of Content

Introduction
Audit Summary
System Overview
Potential Risks
Findings
Appendix 1. Definitions
Appendix 2. Scope
Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Disclaimer

Want a comprehensive audit report like this?

Introduction

We express our gratitude to the eStorm team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.

E-STORM plugin-algebra is a plugin system built on top of the Algebra Integral DEX protocol that introduces fungible ERC-20 LP tokens as representations of concentrated liquidity positions.

Document

NameSmart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for eStorm
Audited ByOlesia Bilenka; Ivan Bondar
Approved ByIvan Bondar
WebsiteN/A
Changelog23/02/2026 - Preliminary Report
10/03/2026 - Remediation Report
02/06/2026 - Final Report
PlatformN/A
LanguageSolidity
TagsFactory; Token Standards used (ERC20, ERC721, etc); Automated Market Maker (AMM); Liquidity Pool
Methodologyhttps://docs.hacken.io/methodologies/smart-contracts
  • Document

    Name
    Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for eStorm
    Audited By
    Olesia Bilenka; Ivan Bondar
    Approved By
    Ivan Bondar
    Website
    N/A
    Changelog
    23/02/2026 - Preliminary Report
    10/03/2026 - Remediation Report
    02/06/2026 - Final Report
    Platform
    N/A
    Language
    Solidity
    Tags
    Factory; Token Standards used (ERC20, ERC721, etc); Automated Market Maker (AMM); Liquidity Pool

Review Scope

Repositoryhttps://github.com/OrganizationE-STORM/plugin-algebra-hacken-auditor
Commit7bc5d54
Remediation Commit8c50ecf
Final Commitc2b3f9e

Audit Summary

26Total Findings
26Resolved
0Accepted
0Mitigated

The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report

Documentation quality

  • Functional requirements are partially missed.

  • Technical description is not provided.

Code quality

  • The development environment is configured.

Test coverage

Code coverage of the project is 93% (branch coverage).

  • Deployment and basic user interactions are covered with tests.

  • The current tests cover the majority of scenarios, with a small number of edge cases remaining.

  • Interactions by several users are tested thoroughly.

System Overview

E-STORM plugin-algebra is a plugin system built on top of the Algebra Integral DEX protocol that introduces fungible ERC-20 LP tokens as representations of concentrated liquidity positions. Instead of requiring users to hold non-fungible position NFTs (as is standard in concentrated liquidity DEXs), the plugin allows multiple users to pool liquidity into shared tick ranges and receive proportional, fungible LP tokens in return.

When a user deposits liquidity into a specific tick range (either directly via the callback contract or by transferring an existing Algebra NFT position), the plugin mints LP tokens proportional to the value contributed relative to the existing position. LP token amounts for the first depositor in a given tick range are set to a fixed initial amount; subsequent depositors receive tokens proportional to the ratio of their deposit value to the pre-existing position value, both denominated in token1 terms using the current pool price. Withdrawals burn LP tokens and return a proportional share of the underlying liquidity plus accrued fees.

The plugin also intercepts swaps on the associated Algebra pool to apply a configurable plugin fee (expressed in parts per million) on top of the pool's base swap fee. Collected plugin fees accumulate in the plugin contract and can be withdrawn by the factory owner.

The system is deployed through a factory pattern: the LPPluginFactory owner creates custom Algebra pools and deploys LPPlugin instances bound to those pools. Each plugin deploys its own LPCallback helper for minting positions and creates LPToken ERC-20 contracts on demand via the LPTokenFactory for each unique tick range.

Files in scope

  • LPPlugin.sol - Core plugin contract that hooks into Algebra pool lifecycle events (position modifications, swaps). Manages the mapping of tick ranges to fungible LP tokens, handles LP token minting/burning proportional to deposited value, processes NFT-to-LP-token conversions via onERC721Received, computes position values, and applies a configurable plugin fee on swaps.

  • LPPluginFactory.sol - Ownable factory contract that deploys LPPlugin instances, creates custom Algebra pools via the entry point, and provides owner-gated administrative functions to configure pool parameters (tick spacing, plugin address, plugin config, fees) and manage plugin fee collection and rates.

  • LPCallback.sol - Helper contract deployed per-plugin that executes mint calls on the Algebra pool on behalf of the plugin. Implements the algebraMintCallback to transfer tokens from the payer to the pool, supporting native token wrapping and transferFrom-based payments.

  • LPToken.sol - Standard ERC-20 token with owner-restricted mint and burn functions. Each instance represents shares of a specific tick-range liquidity position. Ownership is transferred to the calling LPPlugin upon creation.

  • LPTokenFactory.sol - Stateless factory that deploys new LPToken instances and transfers their ownership to the caller (LPPlugin).

  • CallbackStructs.sol - Library defining the MintCallbackData struct used to pass pool key and payer information through Algebra's mint callback mechanism.

  • ILPCallback.sol - Interface for the LPCallback contract, extending IAlgebraMintCallback with a mint function signature.

  • ILPPluginFactory.sol - Interface for the LPPluginFactory, exposing deploy, WNativeToken, and lpTokenFactory accessors.

  • ILPToken.sol - Interface for LPToken, extending IERC20 with mint, burn, and transferOwnership functions.

  • ILPTokenFactory.sol - Interface for LPTokenFactory, exposing the create function.

Privileged roles

LPPluginFactory.sol:

  • owner (OpenZeppelin Ownable): Has full administrative control over the system. Can:

    • Deploy new LPPlugin instances via deploy.

    • Create custom Algebra pools via the inherited createCustomPool.

    • Set tick spacing on any managed pool via setTickSpacing.

    • Replace the plugin address on any managed pool via setPlugin.

    • Reconfigure plugin hook flags on any managed pool via setPluginConfig.

    • Set the base swap fee on any managed pool via setFee.

    • Collect accumulated plugin fees from any plugin via collectFee.

    • Update the plugin fee rate on any plugin via setPluginFeeRate.

    • Transfer ownership or renounce ownership (inherited from Ownable).

LPPlugin.sol:

  • pluginFactory (acts as the authorized caller via _authorize): The only address permitted to:

    • Set the plugin fee rate via setPluginFeeRate.

    • Collect plugin fees via collectPluginFee (inherited from AbstractPlugin).

  • pool (the associated Algebra pool, enforced via onlyPool modifier):

    • The only address permitted to invoke plugin hook functions: beforeInitialize, beforeModifyPosition, afterModifyPosition, beforeSwap, and handlePluginFee.

LPToken.sol:

  • owner (OpenZeppelin Ownable, transferred to the LPPlugin upon creation): The only address permitted to:

    • Mint new LP tokens via mint.

    • Burn LP tokens from any holder via burn.

    • Transfer ownership or renounce ownership (inherited from Ownable).

Potential Risks

Dependency on Algebra Integral Protocol Infrastructure: The system operates as a plugin within the Algebra Integral DEX ecosystem. Core functionality, including pool creation, liquidity management, swap execution, fee accrual, and position accounting, is delegated to external Algebra contracts (AlgebraPool, AlgebraFactory, AlgebraCustomPoolEntryPoint, NonfungiblePositionManager). Any vulnerability, upgrade, or behavioral change in these external contracts directly affects the security and correctness of the plugin system, including LP token valuation, fee distribution, and withdrawal mechanics.

Concentrated Liquidity Price-Dependent Valuation Risk: LP token minting and withdrawal calculations depend on the instantaneous pool price to convert between token0 and token1 denominations. In concentrated liquidity pools, position value is highly sensitive to price movements within and outside the specified tick range. Significant price volatility may cause LP token valuations to diverge from the underlying position's realized value, and positions that move entirely out of range may become single-sided, affecting withdrawal ratios.

Incompatibility with Fee-on-Transfer and Rebasing Tokens: The plugin system relies on nominal transfer amounts for token accounting. Approvals, callback payments, and LP token minting calculations use return values and specified amounts rather than balance deltas. Tokens that charge a fee on transfer or that rebase (adjust balances automatically) are incompatible with this architecture and may result in accounting mismatches, failed transactions, or loss of funds if used as pool tokens.

Centralized Administrative Control over Plugin Parameters: The LPPluginFactory owner holds unilateral authority over critical operational parameters: plugin fee rates, pool fee configuration, tick spacing, plugin replacement, and plugin fee collection. Compromise or misuse of the owner key may result in extraction of accumulated plugin fees, modification of fee rates to unfavorable levels, or replacement of the active plugin on a pool, directly impacting all LP token holders.

LP Token Ownership Concentration: Each LPToken contract is owned exclusively by the LPPlugin that created it. The plugin is the sole entity authorized to mint and burn LP tokens. If the plugin becomes non-functional (e.g., due to a pool-level configuration change that disconnects the plugin), LP token holders may lose the ability to withdraw their underlying liquidity through the standard withdrawal path.

Dependence on External NFT Position Manager Trust Model: The onERC721Received flow delegates position management operations (positions, decreaseLiquidity, collect) to msg.sender, which is expected to be a legitimate NonfungiblePositionManager.

Findings

Code
Title
Status
Severity
F-2026-1513Incorrect Token0-to-Token1 Conversion in convertToken0ToToken1 Leads to Mispriced LP Token Shares
fixed

Critical
F-2026-1512Accumulated Fees Lost During NFT Migration
fixed

Critical
F-2026-1513Unvalidated msg.sender in onERC721Received Allows Theft of Accumulated Plugin Token Balances
fixed

Critical
F-2026-1512Tokens Lost When Migrating Out-of-Range NFT Positions
fixed

Critical
F-2026-1514First-Depositor Inflation Attack via positionValue Rounding to Zero Leads to Theft of Subsequent Depositors' Funds
fixed

High
F-2026-1517Missing getCurrentFee() implementation and incompatible setFee() in LPPluginFactory
fixed

Medium
F-2026-1698[DualDefense] Missing Refund of Unconsumed Tokens in deposit Function
fixed

Medium
F-2026-1521Documentation-Implementation Mismatch: Permissionless Plugin Deployment
fixed

Low
F-2026-1520Absence of Minimum LP Token Output Protection in Deposit Flow Exposes Users to Sandwich-Induced LP Token Dilution
fixed

Low
F-2026-1513deploy Function Requires Undocumented Role Configuration and Multiple Transactions
fixed

Low
1-10 of 26 findings

Identify vulnerabilities in your smart contracts.

Appendix 1. Definitions

Severities

When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.

Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:

Severity

Description

Critical
Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

High
High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

Medium
Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

Low
Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
  • Severity

    Critical

    Description

    Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    High

    Description

    High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.

    Severity

    Medium

    Description

    Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.

    Severity

    Low

    Description

    Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.

Potential Risks

The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.

Appendix 2. Scope

The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:

Scope Details

Repositoryhttps://github.com/OrganizationE-STORM/plugin-algebra-hacken-auditor
Commit7bc5d547e196e1a43f9b609826fb081d6b38e1d5
Remediation Commit8c50ecf3657753e4de33d95851f9b2566103b4f0
Final Commitc2b3f9e2e78bb9eb19030e3e776ebfa81c9128cd
WhitepaperN/A
RequirementsNatSpec
Technical RequirementsREADME.md

Appendix 3. Additional Valuables

Additional Recommendations

The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.

To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:

  • Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.

  • Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.

  • Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.

These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.

Frameworks and Methodologies

This security assessment was conducted in alignment with recognised penetration testing standards, methodologies and guidelines, including the NIST SP 800-115 – Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment , and the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) , These assets provide a structured foundation for planning, executing, and documenting technical evaluations such as vulnerability assessments, exploitation activities, and security code reviews. Hacken’s internal penetration testing methodology extends these principles to Web2 and Web3 environments to ensure consistency, repeatability, and verifiable outcomes.

Disclaimer