- Hacken
- Audits
- shuttle-labs
- [SCA] Shuttle Labs | Rust | Jan2025
Audit name:
[SCA] Shuttle Labs | Rust | Jan2025
Date:
Jan 27, 2025
Table of Content
Introduction
We express our gratitude to the Shuttle Labs team for the collaborative engagement that enabled the execution of this Smart Contract Security Assessment.
The Shuttle Labs is a groundbreaking solution, synthesizing advanced cross-chain liquidity management and order execution methodologies into a seamless, high-performance cross-chain asset transfer system.
Document | |
|---|---|
| Name | Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Shuttle Labs |
| Audited By | Przemyslaw Swiatowiec |
| Approved By | Grzegorz Trawinski |
| Website | bridgesmarter.com→ |
| Changelog | 16/01/2025 - Preliminary Report, 27/01/2025 - Final Report |
| Platform | Solana |
| Language | Rust |
| Tags | Liquidity, Orders, Bridge |
| Methodology | https://hackenio.cc/sc_methodology→ |
Document
- Name
- Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Shuttle Labs
- Audited By
- Przemyslaw Swiatowiec
- Approved By
- Grzegorz Trawinski
- Website
- bridgesmarter.com→
- Changelog
- 16/01/2025 - Preliminary Report, 27/01/2025 - Final Report
- Platform
- Solana
- Language
- Rust
- Tags
- Liquidity, Orders, Bridge
- Methodology
- https://hackenio.cc/sc_methodology→
Review Scope | |
|---|---|
| Repository | https://github.com/Shuttle-Labs/genius-contracts-solana→ |
| Commit | 1ca628357d27f652d6e16e00cda53e36697b1a07 |
Review Scope
- Commit
- 1ca628357d27f652d6e16e00cda53e36697b1a07
Audit Summary
The system users should acknowledge all the risks summed up in the risks section of the report
Documentation quality
Functional requirements are provided.
Technical description is provided.
Code quality
The development environment is configured.
Test coverage
Several tests are provided including both success and negative test cases. Due to the limitation of tools in the Solana ecosystem, the test coverage could not be calculated.
System Overview
The Shittle Labs is a cross-chain asset transfer and liquidity management system designed to facilitate seamless token swaps and asset movement between multiple blockchain networks. Users can deposit tokens into a vault to create orders for cross-chain execution. Orchestrators, operated by the protocol, are responsible for processing these orders and ensuring the accurate transfer of assets to the target chain.
Key components of the system include:
Global State: Maintains critical configuration and operational parameters, such as admin keys, fee settings, and system status (e.g., frozen or active).
Orchestrators: Specialized accounts that handle order execution and liquidity management on the protocol's behalf. Orchestrators process orders, claim fees, and manage bridge liquidity.
Vault: The central repository for user deposits and liquidity management. It securely holds assets until orders are processed or withdrawn.
Fee Management: Enforces a minimum fee structure for cross-chain transactions, ensuring orchestrators are compensated for their work. This includes dynamic fee adjustments to adapt to varying gas costs across chains.
Order Lifecycle: Supports order creation and order fill.
Privileged roles
Admin
Responsible for initializing the protocol, managing orchestrators, updating global parameters, and nominating new admins.
Orchestrators
Execute cross-chain orders, claim processing fees, and manage bridge liquidity.
Operated by the protocol and must remain authorized to function.
Freeze/Thaw Authorities
Control the operational state of the protocol by freezing or thawing the global state to manage sensitive operations.
Users
Create and manage orders by depositing tokens into the vault for cross-chain execution.
Potential Risks
Off-Chain Orchestrator Vulnerability - Many processes are handled off-chain, making orchestrators a potential weak point. Malicious actors could target orchestrators to disrupt protocol operations.
Centralization Risk - Since orchestrators are operated by a single company, there is a risk of centralization, which may reduce the protocol's trustworthiness and resilience to failure or malicious behavior.
Lack of Documentation on Key Processes - Processes such as swapping all tokens back and forth to USDC are not well-documented. This lack of clarity can lead to misunderstandings, improper implementation, or unintentional errors by orchestrators and developers.
Findings
Code ― | Title | Status | Severity | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| F-2025-8250 | Fee Amount Not Validated, Allowing Users to Create Orders with Insufficient Fee | fixed | Critical | |
| F-2025-8249 | Missing Minimum Order Amount Validation Can Lead to System Inefficiency and Off-Chain DoS Risks | fixed | Medium | |
| F-2025-8187 | Lack of Order Cancellation Mechanism Forces Protocol to Cover Processing Costs for Mismanaged Fees | fixed | Low | |
| F-2025-8183 | Orchestrator Accounts Are Not Closed Upon Removal, Leading to Wasted Rent | accepted | Observation | |
| F-2025-8181 | Use Anchor Events Instead of msg! for Structured Logging | accepted | Observation | |
| F-2025-8186 | Incorrect Length Validation in AddGlobalStateAuthority Allows Adding One Extra Authority | fixed | Observation | |
| F-2025-8182 | Missing Event Emission for Critical Actions | fixed | Observation |
Appendix 1. Definitions
Severities
When auditing smart contracts, Hacken is using a risk-based approach that considers Likelihood, Impact, Exploitability and Complexity metrics to evaluate findings and score severities.
Reference on how risk scoring is done is available through the repository in our Github organization:
Severity | Description |
|---|---|
Critical | Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
High | High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation. |
Medium | Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category. |
Low | Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution. |
Severity
- Critical
Description
- Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- High
Description
- High vulnerabilities are usually harder to exploit, requiring specific conditions, or have a more limited scope, but can still lead to the loss of user funds or contract state manipulation.
Severity
- Medium
Description
- Medium vulnerabilities are usually limited to state manipulations and, in most cases, cannot lead to asset loss. Contradictions and requirements violations. Major deviations from best practices are also in this category.
Severity
- Low
Description
- Major deviations from best practices or major Gas inefficiency. These issues will not have a significant impact on code execution.
Potential Risks
The "Potential Risks" section identifies issues that are not direct security vulnerabilities but could still affect the project’s performance, reliability, or user trust. These risks arise from design choices, architectural decisions, or operational practices that, while not immediately exploitable, may lead to problems under certain conditions. Additionally, potential risks can impact the quality of the audit itself, as they may involve external factors or components beyond the scope of the audit, leading to incomplete assessments or oversight of key areas. This section aims to provide a broader perspective on factors that could affect the project's long-term security, functionality, and the comprehensiveness of the audit findings.
Appendix 2. Scope
The scope of the project includes the following smart contracts from the provided repository:
Scope Details | |
|---|---|
| Repository | https://github.com/Shuttle-Labs/genius-contracts-solana→ |
| Commit | 1ca628357d27f652d6e16e00cda53e36697b1a07 |
| Whitepaper | Provided as files. |
| Requirements | Provided as files. |
| Technical Requirements | Provided as files. |
Scope Details
- Commit
- 1ca628357d27f652d6e16e00cda53e36697b1a07
- Whitepaper
- Provided as files.
- Requirements
- Provided as files.
- Technical Requirements
- Provided as files.
Assets in Scope
Appendix 3. Additional Valuables
Additional Recommendations
The smart contracts in the scope of this audit could benefit from the introduction of automatic emergency actions for critical activities, such as unauthorized operations like ownership changes or proxy upgrades, as well as unexpected fund manipulations, including large withdrawals or minting events. Adding such mechanisms would enable the protocol to react automatically to unusual activity, ensuring that the contract remains secure and functions as intended.
To improve functionality, these emergency actions could be designed to trigger under specific conditions, such as:
Detecting changes to ownership or critical permissions.
Monitoring large or unexpected transactions and minting events.
Pausing operations when irregularities are identified.
These enhancements would provide an added layer of security, making the contract more robust and better equipped to handle unexpected situations while maintaining smooth operations.