

**HACKEN**

# SMART CONTRACT CODE REVIEW AND SECURITY ANALYSIS REPORT

Customer: Pera

Date: April 05<sup>th</sup>, 2022

This document may contain confidential information about IT systems and the intellectual property of the Customer as well as information about potential vulnerabilities and methods of their exploitation.

The report containing confidential information can be used internally by the Customer, or it can be disclosed publicly after all vulnerabilities are fixed – upon a decision of the Customer.

## Document

<b>Name</b>	Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis Report for Pera.
<b>Approved By</b>	Evgeniy Bezuglyi   SC Department Head at Hacken OU
<b>Type of Contracts</b>	ERC20 token; Staking; Yield Farming
<b>Platform</b>	EVM
<b>Language</b>	Solidity
<b>Methods</b>	Architecture Review, Functional Testing, Computer-Aided Verification, Manual Review
<b>Website</b>	<a href="https://www.pera.finance">https://www.pera.finance</a>
<b>Timeline</b>	16.03.2022 - 05.04.2021
<b>Changelog</b>	23.03.2022 - Initial Review 05.04.2022 - Remediations Check



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## Introduction

Hacken OÜ (Consultant) was contracted by Pera (Customer) to conduct a Smart Contract Code Review and Security Analysis. This report presents the findings of the security assessment of the Customer's smart contracts.

## Scope

The scope of the project is smart contracts in the repository:

### Repository:

#### Initial Review

<https://github.com/perafinance/peraplatform/commit/2e02b430c7641121e8053cf6718087115a5cf9d5> - Pera Farming

<https://github.com/perafinance/pera-staking/commit/952230ed67a040c9b0f37b20511385fbf61195f5> - Pera Staking

#### Remediation Check

<https://github.com/perafinance/peraplatform/>

<https://github.com/perafinance/pera-staking/>

### Commit:

#### Initial Review

952230ed67a040c9b0f37b20511385fbf61195f5 - Pera Staking

2e02b430c7641121e8053cf6718087115a5cf9d5 - Pera Farming

#### Remediation Check

e1a34b8e51ec9564ea934c659642b099e8732808 - Pera Staking

7969ae040763fb3e882ac731882676d09d024036 - Pera Farming

**Technical Documentation:** Yes -

<https://www.pera.finance/info/PeraFinanceNewDeck.pdf>

**JS tests:** Yes

**Contracts:**

PeraStaking.sol

TradeFarming.sol

We have scanned this smart contract for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities. Here are some of the commonly known vulnerabilities that are considered:

Category	Check Item
Code review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Reentrancy</li> <li>▪ Ownership Takeover</li> <li>▪ Timestamp Dependence</li> <li>▪ Gas Limit and Loops</li> <li>▪ Transaction-Ordering Dependence</li> <li>▪ Style guide violation</li> <li>▪ EIP standards violation</li> <li>▪ Unchecked external call</li> <li>▪ Unchecked math</li> <li>▪ Unsafe type inference</li> <li>▪ Implicit visibility level</li> <li>▪ Deployment Consistency</li> <li>▪ Repository Consistency</li> </ul>

Functional review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Business Logics Review</li> <li>▪ Functionality Checks</li> <li>▪ Access Control &amp; Authorization</li> <li>▪ Escrow manipulation</li> <li>▪ Token Supply manipulation</li> <li>▪ Assets integrity</li> <li>▪ User Balances manipulation</li> <li>▪ Data Consistency</li> <li>▪ Kill-Switch Mechanism</li> </ul>
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## Executive Summary

Score measurements details can be found in the corresponding section of the [methodology](#).

### Documentation quality

The Customer provided superficial functional requirements and no technical requirements. Total Documentation Quality score is **3** out of **10**.

### Code quality

The total CodeQuality score is **5** out of **10**. Code follows best practices. Unit tests were provided. Test coverage is very low and does not check for multiple user-related cases.

### Architecture quality

The architecture quality score is **10** out of **10**. Both projects follow recommended design patterns and best practices. Projects have clean and clear structures.

### Security score

As a result of the audit, security engineers found **5** high, **4** medium, and **5** low severity issues. The security score is **0** out of **10**. All found issues are displayed in the “Issues overview” section.


As a result of the remediations review, Customer’s smart contracts contain **2** medium and **3** low severity issues. The security score is **10** out of **10**

### Summary

According to the assessment, the Customer's smart contract has the following score: **8.8**



*Graph 1. The distribution of vulnerabilities after the audit.*



## Severity Definitions

Risk Level	Description
<b>Critical</b>	Critical vulnerabilities are usually straightforward to exploit and can lead to assets loss or data manipulations.
<b>High</b>	High-level vulnerabilities are difficult to exploit; however, they also have a significant impact on smart contract execution, e.g., public access to crucial functions
<b>Medium</b>	Medium-level vulnerabilities are important to fix; however, they cannot lead to assets loss or data manipulations.
<b>Low</b>	Low-level vulnerabilities are mostly related to outdated, unused, etc. code snippets that cannot have a significant impact on execution

## Findings

### ■■■■ Critical

No critical issues were found.

### ■■■ High

#### 1. Undocumented owner functionality

The owner can withdraw all tokens from the contract. This behavior is not mentioned in the provided documentation.

**Contracts:** PeraStaking.sol

**Function:** withdrawTokens()

**Recommendation:** remove the function or provide the description in the documentation.

**Status:** Fixed

#### 2. Potential DoS Risk

Iteration over the activeRewards array can consume much Gas as the size of the array grows.

This could lead to potential Denial of Service.

**Contracts:** PeraStaking. sol

**Function:** updateReward()

**Recommendation:** the contract design should be changed to avoid data updates for all its users during one single call.

**Status:** Mitigated

#### 3. Potential Reward Token Balance Shortage

Rewards in all available tokens are transferred during one call. If there is at least one token whose balance is insufficient, the whole call will fail.

**Contracts:** PeraStaking. sol

**Function:** claimAllRewards()

**Recommendation:** allow to claim rewards one by one or by batches provided by a caller.

**Status:** Mitigated

#### 4. Missing Reward Balance Update

`claimAllRewards` function does not decrease `totalRewardBalance` after reward transfer to a user.

This can lead to an incorrect reward token balance. If the staking and reward tokens are the same, this can lead to the usage of deposited funds as reward funds.

**Contracts:** TradeFarming. sol

**Function:** `claimAllRewards()`

**Recommendation:** Decrease `totalRewardBalance` during rewards claiming.

**Status:** Mitigated

#### 5. Reward and Staking Token Balances Should be Separate

The contract should separate reward and staking token balances.

In the case of these tokens being the same, this could lead to the use of staking tokens in the name of reward tokens.

**Contracts:** PeraStaking. sol

**Function:** -

**Recommendation:** Review and check this logic.

**Status:** Fixed

### ■ ■ Medium

#### 1. Missing Allowance Check

The `safeTransferFrom` function is being called in other functions, but they never check if there is enough allowance prior to calling it.

This can lead to reverts in the calling functions.

**Contracts:** PeraStaking. sol, TradeFarming.sol

**Function:** `depositRewards()`, `swapExactTokensForETH()`,  
`swapTokensForExactETH()`, `swapETHForExactTokens()`,  
`swapExactETHForTokens()`

**Recommendation:** Add control mechanisms for allowances. Adjust the allowance before calling the `safeTransferFrom` function

**Status:** Mitigated

## 2. Revert due to transfer Function Gas Limitation

The `swapETHForExactTokens` functions cannot be called from another contract with a fallback function. This is because the transfer function has a hardcoded Gas upper limit, used in the refunding logic.

This can lead to limitations in the system.

**Contracts:** TradeFarming.sol

**Function:** `swapETHForExactTokens()`

**Recommendation:** Use the call function, which allows the caller to send all the Gas.

**Status:** Reported

## 3. Unused Return

There are calls to `EnumerableSet.UintSet`'s functions but return values of these calls are ignored.

This can lead to unexpected behaviors in the function execution.

**Contracts:** TradeFarming. sol

**Function:** `swapExactETHForTokens()`, `swapETHForExactTokens()`,  
`swapExactTokensForETH()`, `swapTokensForExactETH()`

**Recommendation:** Implement control mechanisms.

**Status:** Reported

## ■ Low

### 1. Missing Zero Address Validation

The constructor and `depositRewardTokens` take address parameters but do not check if they are zero address.

This can lead to unwanted external calls to `0x0`.

**Contracts:** TradeFarming.sol

**Function:** `constructor()` and `depositRewardTokens()`

**Recommendation:** Implement zero address checks.

**Status:** Fixed

## 2. Unused State Variable

Field `MAX\_UINT` is never used.

**Contracts:** TradeFarming.sol

**Function:** -

**Recommendation:** Remove unused variable.

**Status:** Fixed

## 3. Use of Hardcoded Values

The constructor and mulDiv functions use hardcoded values in their computations.

In PeraStaking.sol contract, withdraw, calcWeight, and \_decrease functions use hardcoded values in their computations.

**Contracts:** TradeFarming.sol, PeraStaking.sol

**Function:** withdraw(), calcWeight(), \_decrease(), constructor(), mulDiv()

**Recommendation:** Move hardcoded values to constants.

**Status:** Reported

## 4. Functions That Can be Declared as *external*

To save Gas, public functions that are never called in the contract should be declared as *external*.

**Contracts:** PeraStaking.sol

**Function:** calcWeight()

**Recommendation:** Aforementioned function should be declared as *external*.

**Status:** Reported

## 5. Floating Pragma

The PeraStaking.sol, and TradeFarming.sol contracts use floating pragma ^0.8.11

**Contracts:** PeraStaking.sol, TradeFarming.sol

**Function:** -

**Recommendation:** Consider locking the pragma version whenever possible and avoid using a floating pragma in the final deployment

**Status:** Reported



## Disclaimers

### Hacken Disclaimer

The smart contracts given for audit have been analyzed by the best industry practices at the date of this report, with cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in smart contract source code, the details of which are disclosed in this report (Source Code); the Source Code compilation, deployment, and functionality (performing the intended functions).

The audit makes no statements or warranties on the security of the code. It also cannot be considered a sufficient assessment regarding the utility and safety of the code, bug-free status, or any other contract statements. While we have done our best in conducting the analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report only – we recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contracts.

### Technical Disclaimer

Smart contracts are deployed and executed on a blockchain platform. The platform, its programming language, and other software related to the smart contract can have vulnerabilities that can lead to hacks. Thus, the audit cannot guarantee the explicit security of the audited smart contracts.